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This paper analyses the main critiques addressed by the literature and the policy-
makers to the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact. It further indicates to what extent the 
2005 reform of the Pact meets those critics. It finally argues that the 2005 reform may 
be too little and arrive too late to restore the Pact credibility, ensure its enforceability 
and correctly set the derogations to the excessive deficit procedure on the nature of 
the shocks which cause the output gap rather than its size: a 3% of GDP limit on 
deficit spending may be a too binding constraint in front of a strongly negative 
demand shock, while it is irrationally large in front of a supply shock. Some empirical 
evidence is provided to identify in the last years strongly negative demand shocks 
from other shocks in the 25 EU Member States. Had this identifying method been 
adopted in November 2003, the European Commission and the Council would have 
both agreed to stop the excessive deficit procedure against Germany, but they would 
have both proceeded against France which apparently was not at the time hit by a 
strongly negative demand shock. 
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“At the moment, EU Member 
States often cooperate in areas 
where they should compete, 
and compete in areas where 
they should be speaking with a 
single voice” 
 
 (Mark Leonard, 2002, p. 146.) 
 
1. Introduction 
Of the two major macroeconomic policies (monetary and fiscal policy), surprisingly 
enough, the former benefits from a large space in the existing (consolidated version of 
the) Treaty Establishing the European Communities (TEC) and in the future, still 
potential, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (CON), while it is hard to 
find even the location1 of fiscal policy both in the current and in the possibly future 
primary norms of the European Union. That does not mean that the European fiscal 
policy is literally ignored by norms, for two reasons. First, because the most important 
component2 of that policy is discussed both in TEC (Article 104) and, almost 
identically, in CON (Article III-184) and in their annexed Protocol on “excessive 
                                                 
1 At first, fiscal policy appears indeed to be almost absent in European primary norms, if one looks at 
the level of disaggregation given by Parts, Titles, Chapters and Sections of the Treaties. That policy 
is not even mentioned in the principles and in the long list of policies provided in TEC (Articles 2 
and 3 in Part 1 and Part 3 Titles I-XXI); and the same impression is given by CON, if one reads the 
objectives of the Union (Article I-3 in Part 1 Title I), the Union competences and the list of more 
than 25 economic policies described there (Articles I-11 – I-17 in Part 1 Title III and Part 3 
particularly Title III Chapters 1-5).  
2  But there are two other TEC Articles important for the European fiscal policy: Article 99 concerns 
the “multilateral surveillance”, as “Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council” and “the Council 
shall…monitor…the consistency of economic policies with the  board guidelines”; Article 103 
regards the no-bailout constraint, as both the Community and each Member State “shall not be liable 
for or assume the commitments of central Governments, regional, local or other public authorities”. 
1 
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deficit procedure” (EDP), but it is hidden in these texts under the too general label of 
“economic policy” (a Chapter in TEC, which becomes a Section in CON): that 
requires from the reader a special digging in one of the TEC 200 pages (or in one of 
the 500 pages of CON!). 
Second, because the Treaties are the only primary source of European norms, but by 
no means the only source of the latter. A very significant part of the European fiscal 
policy, formally born in 1997 with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) mark 1 
(hereafter labelled as SGP1), thanks to a European Council Resolution (in 
Amsterdam) and two Council’s Regulations (1466/97, 1467/97), is derived from 
secondary norms. The differences between primary and secondary sources and within 
each of those sets are relevant from the point of view of potential reforms. To change 
the Articles of the Treaties, the ratification procedure directly or indirectly involves 
almost 500 million people belonging to 25 European countries. To modify the 
Protocols it is sufficient to have the unanimity of the European Council, i.e. it is not 
necessary to consult the Member States’ electorates or their representatives. The same 
unanimous procedure is needed to amend the Resolution and the most important of 
the two Council’s Regulations (1467/97), while the other Regulation can be reviewed 
by simple Council majority.   
In this paper I will give (in Sections 2 and 3) a rapid3  description of Article 104 in 
TEC, and of the initial Stability and Growth Pact, including the 2003 first revisions 
(SGP1). I will then analyse (in Section 4) the main critiques addressed to the SGP1 
mainly in the two years preceding its reform and its 2005 transformation in the 
Stability and Growth Pact mark 2 (SGP2) through a European Council and two 
Council Regulations (1055/2005 and 1056/2005), examining the position of experts 
and policy-makers. I will discuss later (in Paragraph 4.6) my own critical position and 
my reform proposal, based on a simple theoretical model (4.6.1) and on some 
empirical evidence derived from macroeconomic data on unemployment and inflation 
and from the harmonised EU-25 Business Surveys (4.6.2). In the following Section 5, 
I will illustrate the major novelties of the SGP2 relative to the SGP1, indicating to 
what extent the 2005 reform of the Pact satisfies the multiple previous critiques. I will 
finally argue (in Section 6) why, in my opinion, the Pact innovations introduced in 
2005 may turn out to be too little and possibly arrive too late, to restore its credibility 
and enforceability and to correctly reset the rational limits of Member States’ deficit 
 
3 A longer description of the SGP1 can be found in Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2005). 
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spending in front of strongly negative demand shocks. Consequently, the first 
impression got by an occasional reader of the Treaties, according to whom there does 
not exist any effective European fiscal policy, may after all be more correct than 
many academic papers on European matters, showing a scholarly, full knowledge of 
every SGP1 and SGP2 detail. 
 
2. The Treaty’s Article 104 and the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure  
Article 104 of TEC (corresponding to Article 104C of the Maastricht Treaty), to 
which I will refer as it is the law actually in force, explicitly imposes reference values 
for the public deficit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios of all Member States in the Union. 
The annexed Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure4 simply states that “the 
reference values - referred to in the Treaty – are 3% for the ratio of the planned or 
actual Government deficit to gross domestic product at market prices [GDP]; 60% for 
the ratio of Government debt to GDP”.  
Four elements of these primary norms on the European fiscal policy deserve the 
maximum attention: their objectives, the derogations to the budgetary surveillance 
general rules, the mitigating factors in evaluating the Member States’ General 
Government deficit and debt, finally, the system of decisions, recommendations, 
sanctions regarding countries’ public finance disequilibria. 
According to Article 104, the objective of the Commission’s monitoring “of the 
budgetary situation and of the stock of Government debt in the Member States” is to 
identify “gross errors”. Some derogations relative to the reference values have to be 
taken into consideration. In fact there does not exist an excessive deficit if the ratio of 
the planned or actual Government deficit to GDP exceeds the reference value, but 
“either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that 
comes close to the reference value; or, alternatively, the excess over the reference 
value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference 
value”. Similarly, there is no excessive debt if its ratio to GDP, though exceeding the 
reference value, “is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace”. Whenever “a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under 
 
4 This is n. 20 in TEC, n. 5 in the Maastricht Treaty and very similarly n. 10 in CON. 
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one or both of the criteria” mentioned above, the Commission’s judgement is not 
mechanical, as Article 104 foresees that “the Commission shall prepare a report” 
which “shall also take into account whether the Government deficit exceeds 
Government investment expenditure and take into account all other relevant factors, 
including the medium term economic and budgetary position of the Member State”. 
Finally, following Article 104, if the Council “decides”, on the basis of “a 
recommendation from the Commission”, that “an excessive deficit exists”, it “shall 
make recommendations to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that 
situation to an end within a given period”, not rigorously specified. 
As a summary, it is easy to understand that the binding constraints imposed by the 
Treaties at the European level on each Member State’s fiscal policy concern, on the 
one hand, the steady state ratio of debt to GDP (at 60%), and, on the other hand, the 
ratio to GDP of the balance between public expenditures and taxes (at 3%, unless 
exceptional and temporary circumstances arise). Each country is therefore free to 
choose the level and the composition of public spending, fiscal rates, General 
Government assets and liabilities compatible with those constraints. 
 
3. The Stability and Growth Pact Mark 1 (Sgp1) 
The Stability and Growth Pact is defined in a formal sense by the European Council 
Resolution issued in Amsterdam on June 17, 1997 and by Council Regulations 
1466/97 and 1467/97 of July of the same year. The basic philosophy underpinning the 
SGP1 remains that of the TEC, but in a more severe, narrower way. “Sound 
Government finances are crucial – it is stated in the Netherlands’ capital - to 
preserving stable economic conditions in the Member States and in the Community. 
They lessen the burden on monetary policy and contribute to low and stable 
inflationary expectations such that interest rates can be expected to be low. They are 
an essential condition for sustainable and non-inflationary growth and a high level of 
employment”.  
In 1997, there is an additional medium term objective (MTO) introduced by the SGP1 
relative to the TEC, i.e. the requirement to reach a balanced budget in the medium-
long run, while the 3%  has to be considered a ceiling never to overcome in the short 
term. More precisely, since the Amsterdam summit, the EU Member States are 
requested to pursue the MTO of a “budget close to the balance or in surplus”, and, if 
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necessary, to adopt corrective measures to eliminate the excessive deficit, which 
“should be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special 
circumstances”. Indeed, the SGP1, on the one side, implacably sets the timing and 
modalities5 of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for the surveillance of budgetary 
flow positions (ignoring for incomprehensible reasons the stock problems) and, on the 
other side, specifies the sanctions on defaulting Member States6. 
The reinforcement of the SGP1 relative to the Treaty is perceived also by looking at 
the 1997 illustration of the derogations to general rules, in particular at the exact 
definition of “the concept of an exceptional and temporary excess over the reference 
value as referred to in Article 104”. Indeed, Regulation 1467/97 states that  “the 
excess of a Government deficit over the reference value shall be considered 
exceptional and temporary, […]  when resulting from an unusual event outside the 
control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial 
position of the General Government, or when resulting from a severe economic 
downturn […].The Commission …shall, as a rule, consider an excess over the 
reference value resulting from a severe economic downturn to be exceptional only if 
there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%. […] The Council shall, in its overall 
assessment, take into account any observations made by the Member State showing 
that an annual fall of real GDP of less than 2 % is nevertheless exceptional in the light 
of further supporting evidence, in particular on the abruptness of the downturn or on 
the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends […]”. 
These are severe, quantitative limitations of Member States’ fiscal policy, which 
become even more severe in the first, significant revision of the 1997 Stability and 
Growth Pact, made in 2003, though the latter has been labelled for political 
 
5 The Amsterdam Resolution states that: “the Council is committed to a rigorous and timely 
implementation of all elements…; in particular: 
• pursuant to Article 104 C, Section 7, it recommends the timely correction of excessive budgetary 
deficits upon emergence or within the following year, unless there are special circumstances;  
• it shall impose sanctions on Member States failing to act in compliance with the Council 
decisions; 
• it shall require a non-interest-bearing deposit whenever the Council decides to apply sanctions to 
a participating Member State in accordance with Article 104c (11); 
• it is invited to convert deposits into fines two years after the decision to sanction the defaulting 
Member State in accordance with Article 104c (11)”. 
6  Article 11 of Regulation 1467/97 states that: “when the excessive deficit results from non-
compliance with the criterion relating to the Government deficit ratio in Article 104c (2) (a), the 
amount of the first deposit shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0,2 % of GDP, and a variable 
component equal to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in the 
preceding year and the reference value of 3 % of GDP”. 
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motivations as a mere reinterpretation. On March 7 2003, the ECOFIN adopted, under 
the Greek Presidency of Mr. Nikos Christodoulakis, a Report (6877/03–Presse 61) on 
“Strengthening the Co-ordination of Budgetary Policies”, initially drawn up by the 
Commission in November 2002, which has been later endorsed by the European 
Council in Brussels on March 20-21 20037. In that Report, the Council, among other 
things8, was asking for a further surveillance on structural balances, alongside with 
the control of the non-cyclically-adjusted budget balances (the only ones really 
monitored up to that time). Indeed, the Member States of the Eurogroup whose budget 
was in deficit were requested to fulfil an additional constraint, reducing annually by 
0.5% of GDP their structural balance, net of automatic stabilizers: “Member States’ 
Stability and Convergence Programmes must continue to present nominal data. 
Compliance with the close to balance or in surplus requirement of the SGP should be 
assessed in cyclically-adjusted terms; one-off measures should be considered on their 
own merits on a case-by-case basis. […] Those euro-area Member States whose 
deficits exceed the close to balance or in surplus requirement are committed to a 
minimum annual reduction of 0.5% of GDP”.  
 
4. The Criticisms to the SGP1 
The 2003 significant revision of the Pact was motivated by serious difficulties 
incurred by various countries in their compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact 
rules. By 2002 the two biggest  EMU Members (Germany and France) were already 
unable to set their deficit to GDP under the ceiling of 3% and their cyclically adjusted 
negative balance was up to 3.5 and 3.8% respectively. In that situation, policy-makers 
and experts were increasing their criticisms to the SGP1. A survey of the six most 
important  kinds of critiques follows. 
 
 
7 The Presidency Conclusions of the Spring European Council 2003 declare: “against this background, 
the European Council endorses the Key Issues Paper adopted by the Council (ECOFIN), which 
together with these Conclusions will be the basis of the forthcoming Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines….while inviting the Council and Member States to implement its Conclusions”. 
8 The Council for the first time introduced in the formal SGP the requirement that the budgetary 
surveillance and the excessive deficit procedure should also contribute to ensuring a satisfactory debt 
(and not only deficit) decrease: “the pace of decline in public debt plays an important role in 
budgetary surveillance, especially in highly indebted countries. In conformity with the Treaty 
provisions, the excessive deficit procedure should contribute to ensuring a satisfactory pace of debt 
reduction”. 
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 4.1. Is the coordination of national fiscal authorities in EMU necessary, as 
proposed by the 1989 Delors Report? 
The first set of critiques concerns the assumed necessity in a monetary union of an ex 
ante  fiscal coordination between European countries, as it is the case in the SGP1. 
The basic idea behind that hypothesis had been discussed by the 1989 Delors Report 
(see Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989). The reasons 
for coordinating fiscal policy rules, thus constraining budget deficits, were twofold: 
on the one hand, to be able to conduct a stabilisation policy at the national level, 
consistent with an appropriate fiscal-monetary policy mix at the Union level; on the 
other hand, to avoid pressures on the ECB, which would ultimately lead to a nominal 
instability and/or loss of credibility of the Central Bank.  
Starting with the first argument made by the Delors Report, one critique to this 
assumed necessity of fiscal coordination between national fiscal authorities through 
the SGP1 is derived from the model of the optimum currency areas. If the eurozone 
were close to such condition, the sufficient degree of wage and price flexibility and of 
productive factor mobility would imply, on the one side, well performing European 
markets and, on the other side, it would make desirable to centralise fiscal budgets 
(De Grauwe, 2005). In that event, the SGP1 would be useless. But EMU is not an 
optimal currency area and therefore “the main [negative] lesson from this literature is 
the absence of adjustment mechanisms… and the stabilisation of country-specific 
disturbances rests entirely on national fiscal policies” (Beetsma-Debrun, 2004a). 
In this perspective, any justification of the need for budgetary coordination of national 
fiscal authorities must rest on a demonstration that there are considerable spillovers on 
EMU partners: a statement  by Buti-Sapir eds. (1998), largely agreed by most experts 
when the euro adventure started in January 1999. If one looks at the basic spillovers, 
three principal channels are observed: the export-import quantitative channel on 
aggregate demand, the terms of trade and the common interest rate in a monetary 
union. Opinions differ strongly as far as the relative empirical weight of these 
spillovers is concerned. While the first two of them are presumably positive 
externalities, the latter is negative. The sort of prevailing conventional wisdom in the 
late 90’s was that the two positive externalities were of limited empirical importance, 
but the negative one was relevant. “This implies that there could be a general 
tendency among EU participants not to take negative interest rates and exchange rate 
effects adequately into account” (Buti-Sapir eds., 1998), thus deciding for too large 
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deficits9. Today, some authors deny the importance of this third externality. For 
example Fitoussi-Saraceno (2002), in describing the “negative externality [which] 
would induce national Governments to run excessive budget deficits allowing them to 
make the other countries pay part of the bill, [state that] the first objection to this 
argument is purely quantitative, considering that a one percent increase in the national 
fiscal deficit would imply a one or two tenths of percent increase at an European 
level. Barely significant, and unlikely to cause a change in the interest rate. More 
importantly, from a theoretical viewpoint, the externality argument can be reversed: 
suppose a budget deficit expansion occurred in one country. If this were unwarranted, 
it would result in inflationary pressure, and hence in reduced competitivity. On the 
other hand, if the deficit responded to a slump in production, it would sustain demand 
and hence income and imports. In both cases, demand for the other countries’ 
production would increase, and their deficit (thanks to increased fiscal revenues) 
would be reduced. Models with either negative or positive fiscal policy spillovers 
have flourished in the recent literature, but nothing, from a theoretical point of view, 
may induce to think that the negative externality would be larger in size than the 
positive one”.  
Beetsma-Uhlig (1997) show in a theoretical model that in EMU short-sighted 
Governments fail to fully internalise the inflationary consequences of their debt 
policies, thus proceeding to an excessive debt accumulation. Therefore, while in the 
absence of EMU, Governments have no incentive to sign a Stability Pact, under an 
EMU they prefer a Stability Pact which diminishes excessive debt accumulation. The 
combination of a centralised monetary policy with a decentralised budgetary policy 
subject to Community rules, “provides – according to Buti-Sapir eds. (1998) and most 
other experts in the late 90’s – for a simple and clear assignment of policies: the single 
monetary policy would, within the framework of preserving price stability, be able to 
provide a common response to aggregate economic developments, whereas 
decentralised budgetary policies and other national economic policy instruments 
would be available for responding to country-specific circumstances”. But “in special 
 
9 Some had previously questioned these statements: for example Sibert (1992) proved that, under 
certain conditions, in a common currency area “as long as fiscal policies are uncoordinated, the 
outcome is deflationary relative to the optimum…as income taxes are set too high”.  Among the first 
authors who modelled the three forms of spillovers and the consequent gain from fiscal policy 
coordination in EMU were Levine-Brociner (1994), who compare a cooperative equilibrium with a 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
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cases of severe common shocks or imbalances, there may be a role for jointly agreed 
and announced budgetary policy action”.  
While my own, partial critique to this approach (distinguishing  only between 
symmetric and asymmetric shocks and not also between demand and supply shocks) 
is delayed till Section 4.6, it is worth noticing some recent critiques to the argument 
on welfare improvement induced by fiscal rules on national authorities, in the 
presence of the three spillovers. Beetsma et al. (2001) demonstrate that ex ante fiscal 
coordination is not always desirable: what is “crucial for the desirability of fiscal 
coordination is the reaction of the ECB to changes in national fiscal policies….given 
the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding or a conflict on 
the orientation of the policy mix) fiscal coordination is likely to prove 
counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across 
countries and the Governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership vis à vis 
the ECB…In that respect it is interesting to note that the conventional wisdom 
according to which fiscal coordination is called for only when large symmetric shocks 
occur is at odds with our results…Fiscal coordination is most likely to be desirable 
when the European economy is hit by asymmetric (demand and supply) 
disturbances”. 
While we will see later that these different results highly depend on the particular 
assumptions made in the theoretical model and sometimes in the specific parameters’ 
values, I like to stress that they concern an ex ante fiscal coordination not an ex post 
one, of the kind the SGP1 is. On the other hand, the Beetsma et al. (2001) idea of 
counterproductive coordination is by no means isolated. It existed, in the literature on 
monetary and fiscal policy strategic interaction, at least since the seminal paper by 
Blinder (1983) and it is flourishing now, as shown by the review on this subject 
written by Beetsma-Debrun (2004a): “In the case of common adverse demand shock, 
fiscal coordination leads to more expansive fiscal policies. The additional monetary 
tightening that this induces may leave both players worse off... Since 
counterproductivity stems from the adverse reaction of the ECB to coordinated fiscal 
actions, fiscal coordination is more likely to be beneficial the less intense the Central 
Bank’s reaction is to the disturbances…This result is valid for demand as well as for 
supply shocks…[Hence] fiscal coordination not based on a strong precommitment 
capacity of the fiscal authorities is likely to be counterproductive”.  
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This argument is, to some extent, related to the one on the preference of rules versus 
discretion, on precommitment in the ex ante coordination (like in the SGP1) relative 
to the ex post  coordination (of the kind established within the Eurogroup), finally on 
the preference of automatic stabilisers relative to fiscal activism  (see also Fatás-
Mihov, 2003a, for other reasons related to negative effects on output volatility and 
growth induced by aggressive fiscal policies).  
Going now to briefly discuss the second argument in favour of fiscal coordination 
made by the 1989 Delors Report, I recall that Fitoussi-Saraceno (2002) debate this 
problem: “excessive deficits may end up in insolvency, forcing the Central Bank to 
intervene (against its own statute) to bail out the country involved; otherwise, banks 
owning the debt would see their financial soundness hampered, and face the risk of 
depositors’ runs. The moral hazard aspect of excessive deficits could hence 
undermine the Central Bank credibility in its commitments to fight inflation. 
Furthermore, as the costs of an ECB bailout would be sustained by all EMU citizens, 
this would encourage irresponsible behaviour of Governments. A constraint on 
deficits can avoid this risk. This argument may be dismissed on several grounds. The 
first is the scarce plausibility of a debt crisis in the present context. Since 1945, even 
in far more turbulent times, European countries never seriously risked default on their 
debt. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) further notice that contrary to Mexico and 
East Asia during the crises of the 1990’s, the European banking system exposure, and 
the term structure of public debt seem more solid, so that the bailout risk is not 
particularly relevant. And, at any rate, they argue that such a risk would be better dealt 
with by improving public debt management and bank regulation”. On this second 
motivation for fiscal coordination offered by the 1989 Delors Report, not only most 
experts seem to be critical today, for example Canzoneri-Diba (2001), but, unlike on 
the first, even the initial positions taken by the literature were much inconsistent with 
the viewpoint of the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union 
(1989). Eichengreen-von Hagen (1995) disagree with the idea “that monetary union 
requires restrictions on the fiscal autonomy of the Member States to prevent them 
from overborrowing because excessive debt may lead to a bailout by the Union and 
threaten the stability of the common currency. This bailout might take two forms: an 
ex post  bailout, involving monetarisation of Government debt, or an ex ante bailout, 
entailing policies designed to keep interest rates on Government debt artificially low 
and thereby to keep debt from rising to unsustainable levels. Either policy would give 
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rise to union-wide inflation and threaten the stability of the common currency. This is 
in contrast to the situation in which each State issues its own lender of last resort and 
therefore internalises the bailout risk”. Eichengreen-von Hagen (1995) challenge this 
view, recalling that the political costs of default are quite high only for Central 
Governments, which are unable to refuse the request for bailout coming from sub-
national Governments, thus threatening the national monetary policy stability, and 
consequently trying to impose fiscal restraints at the decentralised levels. The 
implications for today’s Europe are clear. “Only if one imagines that monetary union 
is accompanied by fiscal centralisation, the pressure for bailout will become equally 
intense.  But in Europe the EU has only limited taxation and expenditure authority” 
and “this is certain to remain so in the foreseeable future. This suggests that the 
rationale for the excessive deficit procedure is weak”. 
In summary, one has to agree with Bryant (2001) when stating that “the existing 
theoretical and empirical evidence is unfortunately inconclusive [on whether] 
coordination on macroeconomic policies yield large gains in welfare…My personal 
eclectism leads me to give more weight to the potential benefits of attempted 
coordination than to the potential risks”. 
While my own reasons for taking this attitude will be clearer later in spite of the 
elements of inappropriate coordination existing in the SGP1, I now examine five more 
sets of critiques addressed to the SGP1. The starting point for them is the following: 
even though fiscal coordination in EMU is presumably improving the economic 
results of the eurozone and even though an ex ante coordination with strong 
precommitments is better than an ex post, soft one, the question remains whether the 
specific fiscal coordination provided by the SGP1 is optimal or at least good  for the 
stated goals and, in particular, for stabilisation purposes. Five kinds of critical answers 
are given to this question: one of a methodological type, discussed in 4.2, and four 
related to the content of the SGP1, including its governance and its economic 
rationale, discussed in 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6.   
 
4.2. The SGP1 methodological problems 
The methodological question regards problems like the choice between numerical 
targets and procedural rules, a subject which Corsetti-Roubini (1992), Alesina-Perotti 
(1996a, 1996b) and Franco et al. (1992) addressed long before the creation of the 
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SGP1. Immediately after the Pact creation, the common opinion of European experts 
was very much influenced by the successful performance of the Maastricht 
parameters. Buti-Sapir eds. (1998), after recalling that the Maastricht convergence 
criteria were examples of numerical targets, note that “they increase the transparency 
and comparability of budget figures among EU Member States. Thus, they restrain the 
tendency of policy-makers to try to obtain a strategic advantage by creating confusion 
concerning the Government’s underlying budgetary situation (Alesina-Perotti, 
1996b). By imposing increased transparency, the Maastricht targets also increase the 
feasibility of expenditure control”. Buti et al. (2005) insist that “replacing the 
numerical limits with procedures ensuring sound budgetary positions would 
raise…problems” of lower transparency, cross-country comparability and potential 
inconsistency with national institutions and traditions. Procedural rules, on the other 
hand, “do not set specific numerical targets, but directly impose changes on the 
procedures according to which Government budgets are presented, adopted and 
carried out”.  
The numerical targets and the procedural rules are not necessarily inconsistent, 
although they may so become. For example, the Maastricht numerical fiscal 
parameters (3% of deficit/GDP and 60% of debt/GDP) are perfectly consistent with 
the procedural rules stating that the deficit to GDP should equal the public investment 
to GDP (according to the golden rule) and the debt to GDP should equal the deficit to 
GDP divided by the nominal GDP growth rate (as the differential equation on the debt 
formation requires), if public investment is 3% of GDP and the latter’s nominal 
growth rate is 5%, as it happened to be the case in the eurozone when the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed, which partly explains its success. But procedural rules are more 
invariant in time and thus much more robust in their validity and effectiveness than 
numerical targets, although they do not have the same appeal of simplicity and 
transparency. This is why I share only partially the preference that European policy-
makers and most experts reveal for numerical targets, in spite of their recognition 
(Buti-Sapir eds., 1998) “that strict numerical rules reduce the responsiveness of 
Government budgets to the cycle and therefore limit the extent to which budgetary 
policies may contribute to the stabilisation of cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activity”. At most, one can agree with Beetsma (2001) that this is a second best 
solution. He states that “the threat of exclusion from EMU has disappeared and many 
countries can expect steep increases in public spending…The first-best solution to 
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fiscal profligacy is to eliminate the distortions in the budget process. Budgetary 
reform is often politically difficult to achieve. Outside pressure, such as agreements at 
the European level on how to reform national target processes is easily seen as Europe 
dictating what countries should do. At the supranational level, fiscal rules such as the 
SGP [mark 1] seem to be the maximum which is achievable”.  
Simplicity and transparency are, according to a wide literature based on the seminal 
paper by Kopits-Symansky (1998), two of the eight characteristics ideal fiscal rules in 
EMU should have: they should be well-defined, transparent, simple, flexible, 
adequate relative to final goals, enforceable, internally and externally consistent, 
underpinned by structural reforms. The last four features cannot be discussed without 
analysing the content of the SGP1, which will be done later. Indeed these are not 
methodological aspects but they concern the Pact content. The first four features, on 
the contrary, are truly methodological. Buti et al. (2003) give a good grade (a B+) to 
the SGP1 fiscal rules for their definition, transparency and flexibility and an excellent 
mark for their simplicity. Overall, the evaluation seems too optimistic, especially as 
far as flexibility is concerned. In fact, after acknowledging that “there are tradeoffs 
between the various criteria”, the three authors indicate that “on the one hand, there 
may be a preference for simplicity and transparency over flexibility to allow peer 
pressure, central monitoring and prevent moral hazard. On the other hand, a 
multiplicity of countries increases heterogeneity and dispersion of preferences, with 
the consequence that one-size-fits-all fiscal rule is likely to be sub-optimal”.  
A further deepening on flexibility leads to understand  that this concept may have two 
different meanings. According to the Commission of the European Communities 
(2005), “there are basically two distinct options to allow for greater flexibility in the 
application of fiscal rules. Either the sophistication of the provisions themselves is 
increased by adding more contingencies to the rules while their implementation is 
kept straightforward, or the rules are kept simple, but a more flexible application is 
introduced, thus exerting more economic judgement of the individual case”. While 
my preference for the former form of flexibility is obvious, given my preference for 
procedural rules rather than numerical targets and given my Socratic acceptance that 
“pacta sunt servanda”, a further deepening by Buiter-Grafe (2004) clarifies that “an 
optimal rule is both credible and flexible. Flexible needs not mean opportunistic. 
Credible needs not mean rigid and inflexible. Indeed, arbitrary and inflexible rules are 
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not credible. Commitment isn’t necessarily sacrificed when a rule is made contingent 
on observable, verifiable events”.  
Moreover, while many experts disagree with the very high score to the SGP1 
methodological aspects  given by Buti et al. (2003 and 2005), for example, 
Eichengreen (2003), Buiter (2004), Creel (2003), I believe that simplicity, 
transparency, flexibility and any other methodological element of the so-called 
optimal fiscal rules may turn out to imply the best possible outcome only if the rule is 
in its content good, otherwise the worst result is obtained;  by contrast, if the rule is in 
its content bad, the best possible outcome is reached when it is badly-defined, difficult 
to understand, complex and rigid. This is to say that these methodological problems 
are, as such, minor problems relative to those concerning the content of the SGP1. 
 
4.3. Is the SGP1 adequate relative to final goals of fiscal policy and externally 
consistent? 
Turning to the exam of the SGP1 in terms of its adequacy relative to the final goals of 
the European fiscal policy, it appears that the latter are not clearly defined. The 
Commission (see Commission of the European Communities (2005) and the experts 
who are very close to it (for example Buti et al., 2003), stress the idea that “the goal 
of the EU fiscal rules is ensuring budgetary prudence”, although the former source 
acknowledges that “the concept of budgetary prudence has widened over the years” to 
include, for example, long-term sustainability10. In this sense, from a preliminary 
quite rude viewpoint, it seems that the SGP1 has not performed very well, given that 
by now all the big Member States and some of the small ones  in the EU exceed the 
ceiling imposed on deficit/GDP. But other experts question the assumption that the 
adequacy of the SGP1 relative to its goals should be measured only in relation to 
budgetary prudence. Coeuré-Pisani Ferry (2005) “assess the SGP1 against three 
metrics: fiscal discipline, macro stabilisation, and support to long-term growth 
[concluding that] it is not excessive to state that it has failed on all three… Having 
failed to take advantage of the 1998-2001 upswing to improve their structural fiscal 
position, EMU countries soon found them to be contradictory. Faced with the post-
2001 slowdown, they had to choose between pursuing fiscal consolidation and 
supporting economic activity: like Buridan ass, they decided to do neither. The SGP1 
 
10 This is recognised also by high officials of the European Commission (see Deroose-Langedigk, 
2005) and of the International Monetary Fund (see Annett et al., 2005). 
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thus failed to correct the deficit bias of EMU… The cyclically-adjusted aggregate 
public deficit of the eurozone actually increased from 1.6% on 1999 to 2.6% in 
2004… The fiscal stance was generally mildly procyclical in the eurozone in the 
period 1997-2005”, implying that the stabilisation and growth function of the public 
budget was not realised. 
The question of fiscal procyclicality is a highly-debated one, as the current opinions 
largely diverge in academic as well as in political European circles. Galí-Perotti 
(2003)  provide an econometric estimate of the fiscal behaviour of EMU countries 
during what they consider to be the most recent three recession episodes (early 80’s, 
early 90’s and 2001-2002) and compare it with the behaviour of non-EMU European  
countries and of non-European countries. According to Galí-Perotti (2003), in the 
early 80’s, the fiscal policy stance (measured by the exogenous primary balance) of 
both the former and the latter groups is procyclical. In the early 90’s, the EMU 
Member States show again a procyclical discretionary policy, while the other 
countries were adopting a countercyclical discretionary fiscal response. “But perhaps 
– the two authors conclude – the most surprising result lies in the fiscal stance among 
EMU countries during the most recent downturn, which happens to be the first one 
where the constraints developed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact have been effectively in place. Interesting enough, that circumstance has 
not prevented EMU countries from pursuing countercyclical fiscal policies during the 
recent recession... suggesting a weaker countercyclical policy in the average EMU 
country [than in the other two groups]. Furthermore, the pattern is not uniform across 
EMU countries, with Germany, France and Ireland being responsible for much of the 
change”. 
In Paragraph 4.6 expressing my own critiques to the SGP1, I will indicate why this 
result would be less surprising if the analysis on fiscal responses to recessions were, 
more correctly, conducted looking also at the specific kind of shocks hitting in various 
years the different countries (demand or supply shocks). But one has to recognise that 
most of the papers in the literature I am reviewing ignore the fundamental distinction 
between demand and supply shocks, faced by countries when deciding their fiscal 
policies ( starting with  Buti-Sapir eds., 1998). Here, however, I want to stress two 
kinds of opposite arguments against the finding of a countercyclical fiscal policy of 
EMU countries, one of a superconservative, another of a superprogressive flavour. 
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The first is exemplified by Fatás-Mihov (2003b), who, on the one hand, estimate “a 
reduction in the use of discretionary policy over the last two decades”, but, on the 
other hand, consider that this is a merit, not a defect of the SGP1, as it provides “a 
protection against the undesirable consequences of policy discretion”. The second 
viewpoint consists of stating that the SGP1 does not allow a sufficiently strong 
countercyclical fiscal stance. For example, Fitoussi-Saraceno (2004) state that one of 
the biggest limitations of the current fiscal policies in Europe is that “any active fiscal 
policy at the national level is ruled out. No actor is supposed to take care of common 
real shocks, as the ECB only has to deal with inflation…According to many 
commentators (e.g. Blinder and Yellen, 2001), the positive performance of the US in 
the past two decades may largely be attributed to their activist policy and to good 
coordination of monetary and fiscal policies”. “In a nutshell – writes Fitoussi (2006) – 
the structure of power is such in Europe that those institutions who have the 
instruments to react have not the legitimacy to do so while those which have the 
legitimacy have no more the instruments. Hence the passivity of European policy 
reactions”.  
Fitoussi (2006) complains also about the insufficient fiscal expansion, due to the 
SGP1, adequate to support growth. He writes that the SGP1 rules “were motivated, 
among other things, by an attempt (failed) to exclude from the euro the so-called 
‘Club Med’ countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal). The norm that emerged with 
non-economical motivations is now trapping those who wanted it… The 
responsibility of bad macroeconomic management in the soft growth regime which 
characterises Europe since at least fifteen years has for long been recognised: the 
abnormally high level of real interest rates in the 90’s, the procyclical evolution of the 
real exchange rate of the euro, the absence of reactions of fiscal policy to the 
succession of shocks in the present decade. So absent macroeconomic policies and 
growth policies, the only apparent way out would then be structural reforms, a leaner 
welfare state and a lower level of public spending. The course of European 
macroeconomic policies can be seen as a way to force structural reforms so as to 
achieve the required increase in inequality”.  
The latter viewpoint is taken by most post-Keynesian scholars, convinced that deficit 
spending helps solving the existing cyclical and long term economic problems in any 
case (independent of the nature of the shocks or the type of structural market failures). 
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It is also shared in the non experts’ public opinion by many detractors of the so-called 
“Europe of bankers”, that monetarist eurocracy perfectly embodied by the Executive 
Board of the European Central Bank, which is thought to be too stability-oriented and 
too little growth-oriented, as if there existed a clear tradeoff between the two targets: a 
tradeoff inexistent when the supply-side problems dominate and precisely denied by 
the approach underpinning the SGP1. Many majority parties, in spite of their different 
political inspirations (from Social-democrats to Conservatives), join that view (see 
CAE, 2004), particularly in large European countries experiencing a scarce growth, 
partly because they wish to please their electorates through an expansionary use of 
public budgets, while opposition parties usually favour a much tighter fiscal policy for 
similar and opposite reasons of political economy (Buti-van den Noord, 2003 and 
2004). 
AS we have already seen, the (external) consistency between fiscal rules and other 
European policies is considered to be a desirable methodological aspect of the SGP1. 
This is not the reason why this composite group of neo-keynesian academicians, 
median voters and policy-makers asks “to lisbonise” the Pact, that is to connect it 
more to the Lisbon Agenda, where the Portuguese capital refers to the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of March 23-24, 2000. The required 
connection between  the SGP1 and the Lisbon Agenda is in fact rather difficult. 
Admittedly, the Pact is the expression of a systematic supply-side approach, where the 
structural rigidities of the system, the insufficient accumulation, the excessive 
presence of the State on the market cause at the same time inadequate growth and 
some propensity for inflation, so that fighting in favour of a higher nominal stability 
would also lead to boost growth. The Lisbon Agenda, on the contrary, stems from a 
compromise between a supply- and a demand-management approach. It shows 
optimism and euphoria for the European economic situation, perhaps because the year 
2000 (when it was signed) is the only one in the past decade when the European 
growth rate was above 3%, so that, according to the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions, 
“the Union [was] experiencing its best macro-economic outlook for a generation”. 
Hence, at the time it seemed right to “sustain the healthy economic outlook and 
favourable growth prospects by applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix”, 
the latter being the typical tools of the Keynesian panoplia, under the hypothesis of a 
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, and no concern for long-term effects 
and sustainability. However, the Lisbon Agenda does not imply abandoning the 
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traditional EU supply-side approach: in fact, the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions 
affirm that “the new strategic goal for the next decade - to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based  economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion -” 
requires stepping up “the process of structural reforms for competitiveness and 
innovation and ... completing the internal market”. 
Buti et al. (2003a) examine another case of potential inconsistency of the SGP1 
relative to structural policies, worrying that the strong emphasis of fiscal policy rules 
on annual targets may deter reforms with long run effects, for example from unfunded 
(pay-as-you-go) to funded pension systems. Beetsma-Debrun (2004b) show that the 
SGP1 erodes incentives to carry out structural reforms sacrificing future growth for 
present stability. They “conclude that a ‘smart’ (i.e. welfare-improving) Pact should 
take into account the budgetary consequences of structural reforms. Indeed, Article 
104 of the Treaty (but not the SGP1) makes reference to the role of medium-term 
economic targets in public finances, which are potentially inconsistent with short-term 
goals. In this same vein, the former German Chancellor, Gerard Schröder, in his 
letter-manifesto to the Financial Times of January 17, 200511, criticises the Pact, 
writing that “in the short time, reforms – as provisions…to safeguard the social 
security system, improve the labour market or introduce fiscal reforms – may obstacle 
growth or increase the deficit. But, in the medium run, their impact on growth, 
employment and public budget is definitely positive. Expenditures on education, 
innovation, research and development can also have a positive effect”. 
 
11 Schröder, in the same letter-manifesto to the Financial Times states that “the Commission and the 
Council should take due account of the Member States’ contributions to the euro-zone 
stabilisation,…of specific constraints, of solidarity initiatives within the Union…the German 
constraints include…the payment of huge sums to the European Union…Besides, the Member 
States’ competence on their economic and budget policies should be respected”. This argument is 
politically strong, as it represents a credible threat, especially on the part of Germany, which is the 
maximum net contributor to the EU budget (in 2003, by 0.36% of its GNI, a figure close to the 
difference between the amount “requested” by the Commission to reduce the German deficit and the 
sum “offered” by Berlin in the famous ECOFIN meeting of November 2003). However, from a 
technical viewpoint, it would be wrong to subtract 0.36% of GNI from the calculation of the German 
deficit/GDP ratio, because without that EU budget, according to Gros (2005), Berlin would spend 
even more and would produce an even larger public deficit for its Eastern Länder. Moreover, 
according to Begg-Schelke (2004), most Member States currently in the dock “are net contributors to 
the EU budget who would have the credible option of retaliating by suspending their fourth resource 
payments to Brussels. Even net recipients always have the credible threat of blocking EU business in 
an ‘empty chair’ protest” (see the data, reported by the Commission of the European Communities 
(2004a) and re-examined by Gros-Micossi (2005).  
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4.4. Is the SGP1 internally consistent? 
As indicated by Kopits-Symansky (1998), another desirable methodological aspect of 
fiscal policy rules for EMU countries is their internal consistency. Hence, some critics 
of the SGP1, perhaps more royalist than the King or more catholic than the Pope, 
focus on the differences between the Treaty (Protocol included) and the 1997 Pact, 
including the 2003 reinterpretation. They rightly point out that Article 104, unlike the 
SGP1, concerns the debt as well as the deficit to GDP and  illustrates the awareness of 
the qualitative distinction between public expenditure in current and in capital 
account. Indeed, deficit spending for investment creates no burden for public finances 
inasmuch the larger productivity it triggers eventually induces a tax rise which tends 
to offset the initial imbalance. Consequently, a revision of the Pact is demanded, 
based on the golden rule, which is already present in Article 115 of the German Basic 
Law of 1949, amended in 1976 (see, for example, Blanchard-Giavazzi, 2003, but also 
Balassone-Franco, 2000); in 2004, this argument has become very popular among 
policy-makers, like the British Chancellor of Exchequer, Gordon Brown, the Italian 
Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, and the French President, Jacques Chirac, who all 
have advocated this approach. The major critiques to those critical comments of the 
SGP1 are summarised in Buti et al. (2005)12. 
A much stronger internal inconsistency within the SGP1 exists, if one looks, on the 
one hand, at the MTO (with its required balanced structural  budget) and, on the other 
hand, at the 60% target of a stable debt to GDP ratio. Another way of expressing this 
inconsistency is by remarking that all the SGP1 rules and in particular those 
concerning the MTO are identical for each country, independent of their level of debt 
and their nominal growth rate. This correct  critique is based on the logical relation 
between the deficit and the debt to GDP, which I mentioned in Paragraph 4.2: in the 
 
12 They write: “First, the alleged incompatibility between the SGP and a properly defined golden rule is 
questionable. In order to spread the burden of capital spending over the different generations of 
taxpayers, the rule would have to refer to net spending”. “Second, if applied to gross public 
investment, the golden rule would be an obstacle to deficit and debt reduction. Given the ratio of 
public investment as a percentage of GDP, the long-run equilibrium level of government debt could 
be quite high, especially in an environment of low inflation. Third, singling out public investment 
from other budget items makes little sense. What is important is overall capital accumulation in both 
private and public capital”. “Moreover, a golden rule may distort expenditure decisions in favour of 
physical assets and against spending on intangibles that can make a relevant contribution to 
economic growth, for example, those increasing human capital. Fourth, the golden rule would make 
the multilateral surveillance process more complex, by providing leeway for opportunistic behaviour 
since Governments would have an incentive to classify current expenditure as capital spending. 
Finally, there are problems of cross-country comparability of the data concerning amortisation”. 
Fiorella Kostoris Padoa Schioppa: The 2005 Reform of the SGP: Too Little, Too Late? 
 
20 
steady state, if no variation occurs in the financial assets and liabilities (which play a 
role in the debt and not in the deficit creation), the debt/GDP ratio equals the 
deficit/GDP ratio divided by the nominal GDP growth rate. Thus, a numerical 
coherence between the two public finance parameters (3% and 60%) existed around 
the years when the Maastricht Treaty was signed (in 1992), but it  has gone lost in the 
following decade and no longer exists today, owing to the slowdown of the European 
economies combined with an inflation decrease and to a reduction in public capital 
accumulation. Furthermore, the logic is completely missing in the SGP1, because it is 
simply impossible to obtain a balanced budget in the medium run together with a 
constant debt/GDP ratio equalling 60% or any other number different from zero, 
according to the Treaties, unless the unlikely and unfavourable hypothesis of a zero 
growth rate is assumed. 
Precisely for this reason, growing countries with debt/GDP ratio below 60% should 
register a deficit in order to obtain that target, while countries above 60% with the 
same objective should develop and maintain a budget close to balance or in surplus. 
In any case, the sacredness of a medium–term balanced budget has to be questioned, 
as it is incomprehensible. De Grauwe (2005) puts it in this way: “The idea that 
countries should comply with a numerical constraint of 3% irrespective of their debt 
levels and underlying economic conditions is ‘stupid’ (the word used by Romano 
Prodi when he described this rule in an interview in Le Monde 2002)”. This idea is 
shared also by many policy-makers. The SGP1 reform proposals of some 
Conservatives, such as those of the Dutch Finance Minister, Gerrit Zalm, who more 
than anyone else in 1997-1998 opposed, together with his then colleague Theo Weigel 
from Germany, the entry of Italy into the Eurogroup, go exactly in this direction. 
They (rightly) recall that the TEC and its Protocol (but not the SGP1) create a 
consistent link between the deficit/GDP and the debt/GDP ratios. Thus, in his 
interview released to the Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore on January 10, 2005, Mr. 
Zalm asks  that the reform of the SGP1 should envisage a “diversified treatment 
among countries according to their debt levels…Hence, Italy, Belgium, Greece…and 
the countries with a public debt above 60% of GDP have to make greater efforts to 
reduce it and must set more severe MTOs in order to tend to a budget surplus. 
Countries with debts below 60% may pursue a less stringent policy and may have 
limited medium-term deficits”. This kind of criticism has been already made upon the 
birth of the SGP1, as even Theo Weigel, who longed for a sharp 3.0% maximum 
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deficit to GDP ratio in the short-term, was willing to allow in certain cases for a 
medium-term negative balance of 1% of GDP (see Stark, 2001). At the same time, 
Minister Zalm is very aware of the fact that, while in the steady state the faster is the 
economic dynamics the higher may be the deficit/GDP ratio for a given target on the 
debt/GDP ratio, in the short run, a procyclical policy has to be avoided being 
preferable “to be more rigorous in managing public accounts when the economic 
cycle is favourable and more flexible in downturns”. 
 
4.5. Is the SGP1 enforceable? 
One of the weakest aspects of the SGP1 is its limited enforceability. A weakness 
which is illustrated in almost all the analytical papers on the subject (for example, 
Buti et al. 2003a and 2005; Buiter, 2004; Buti-Pench, 2004; Buti, 2006; De Grauwe, 
2005, and especially Calmfors, 2005) and it is recognised even by the Commission of 
the European Communities (2005), but it is totally ignored (pour cause!) by policy-
makers. 
This critique is sometimes conducted in very radical terms, in other cases it is 
described as the by-product of the particular governance of the Pact, or of the 
particular circumstances weakening the sanction system.  
The former, radical critique essentially states that selfenforcement is impossible if the 
basic rules of the SGP1 remain flawed. For example, Buiter (2004)  writes that “it has 
become clear even to its most ardent supporters, that the Pact’s arbitrary and rigid 
design provides a ready-made excuse for ignoring its restrictions to all those who 
consider themselves unduly constrained by them. Adherence to the Stability and 
Growth Pact rules would almost surely guarantee fiscal-financing sustainability, but 
would do so at the expenses of macroeconomic stability and the efficient 
intertemporal allocation of public spending and taxation. These disadvantages of the 
Pact have now become so patently obvious that the Pact’s enforcement is becoming 
impossible. A fiscal rule that is not credible and is honoured more in the breach than 
in the observance, undermines the very principles it is intended to promote”. The 
already-quoted critiques by Fitoussi-Saraceno (2004) also draw similar conclusions: 
“The poor growth performance has built tensions that are finally calling into question 
the institutional set up… The Stability Pact is probably going to be substantially 
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ignored”. In the same vein, Enderlein (2004) states that “the SGP now looks like a 
classic example of how an institution can miss its target, generate unintended 
consequences and even result in negative consequences for its initial sponsor. EMU 
has manifestly created largely unexpected problems of domestic fiscal stabilisation… 
Instead of trying to square the circle, the responsible actors in EMU might be better 
off by scrapping the SGP… This approach... could function more effectively than a 
badly-reformed SGP [mark 1]”.  
With a softer attitude, Beetsma-Debrun (2005) argue that “the failure to enforce the 
Pact’s most stringent provisions points to two possible interpretations… The first 
interpretation emphasises  a fundamental lack of enforceability, rooted mainly in the 
fact that the ‘responsibility for making the Member States observe budgetary 
discipline lies essentially with the Council’ (European Court of Justice, 2004), that is 
with (some weighted average of) Member States themselves. The second 
interpretation stresses… that the current procedure pays excessive attention to the 
letter of the regulation… [not to] its spirit, which is to avoid that fiscal expansions 
reduce the benefits of a union-wide commitment to financial stability. Hence the 
failure to recognise that some fiscal expansions are actually warranted made the 
Pact’s implementation procedure excessively rigid, leading a number of Member 
States to worry that the fiscal framework might too early conflict with their interest. 
This might explain why the Commission’s recommendation to proceed… against 
France and Germany did not win the required majority in the Council”.  
While this latter interpretation joins to some extent and in some specific 
circumstances the radical critiques described above, the former interpretation relies on 
the idea that the insufficient enforceability is totally due to the peculiar governance of 
the Pact for three complementary reasons. First, even if the Council were willing to 
adopt the excessive deficit procedure and to decide that a cicada-State needs to be 
corrected and eventually sanctioned, the Council, according to Article 104, could only 
“make recommendations to the Member States concerned”13 : the latter are not strong 
 
13 In fact, this recommendation is only a first step. At a later stage, according to Article 104 Paragraph 
9, “if a Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council, the 
Council may decide to give notice to the Member State to take, within a specified time limit, 
measures for the deficit reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the 
situation». And finally «as long as a Member State fails to comply with a decision taken in 
accordance with Paragraph 9, the Council may decide to apply or, as the case may be, intensify one 
or more of the following measures:  
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instruments14 for the SPG1 effectiveness, as they essentially consist of forms of moral 
suasion, obtaining the desired results only to the extent that the preaching institution 
has a charisma. Second, because the Council is presumably not willing to take that 
decision, on the basis of a recommendation by the Commission, as it consists of 
national politicians, subject to the “tyranny of the democracy”, unlike the 
Commission or a potential super-partes  Authority, if it were created in the wake of a 
new common Code of Conduct for budgetary positions in Europe.  They tend to 
collude both because the rationale of the Pact is weak and because they are short-
sighted as usually is the case among Government policy-makers. In that event, 
obviously, policy coordination – traditionally encouraged and considered a plus in the 
European Treaties – becomes, on the contrary, an instrument for weakening the 
enforcement of fiscal rules in Europe. If this is the situation, the SGP1 governance is 
highly imperfect, because, as Juvenalis used to say, “quis custodiet ipsos custodes” 
(who will watch the watchmen)?15
In the last years, the SGP1 enforceability has further weakened for at least three 
reasons. First, the probability of sanctions diminishes as the number of cicada-States 
increases and the sanctions to them are not promptly adopted. As a matter of fact, the 
majority of EMU countries  is more and more often in one of the two following 
situations: either the country has already overcome some parameters of the Pact (such 
as Ireland or Portugal, who received an early warning in 2001 and 2002 respectively); 
or the country is presently exceeding or is about to exceed the deficit/GDP ceiling 
(among others in 2005 Germany, Italy, Greece and Portugal, in 200616, probably 
Germany, Italy, France, Greece and Portugal, while among the non-euro EU Member 
States many more are above the 3% limit, including the United Kingdom). Facing this 
rising number of “fiscal delinquents”, the excessive deficit procedure is endorsed with 
 
• to require the Member State concerned to publish additional information, to be specified by the 
Council, before issuing bonds and securities,  
• to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member 
State concerned,  
• to require the Member State concerned to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an appropriate 
size with the Community until the excessive deficit has, in the view of the Council, been 
corrected,  
• to impose fines of an appropriate size”.  
14 Notice that the “recommendation” is in the European jargon, unlike the “decision”, not more than a 
non-binding opinion (see Leonard, 2005). 
15 See Buti-Franco eds. ( 2005) for a complete overview of the debate. In particular, Buti (2006) 
confirms that “a legitimate criticism of the Treaty and the old SGP is that enforcement is partisan: 
national authorities are supposed to apply the rules to themselves and therefore have strong 
incentives for collusion and horse-trading”.  
16 See Commission of the European Communities (2005 and 2006). 
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more and more caution, damaging the sanctions’ credibility: the probability of 
sanctions diminishes when the number of “fiscal delinquents” increases, because, as 
indicated by de Haan et al. (2003), presumably it is “politically easier (or less costly) 
to sanction one country for fiscal misbehaviour than many”. 
Second, the SGP1 credibility has been wounded in the ECOFIN of November 2003: 
then the Finance Ministers opposed the recommendations of the Commission 
concerning the excessive deficit procedure for France and Germany, also because 
these two big countries found the obliging support of the ECOFIN temporary 
President, the Italian Minister of Finance Giulio Tremonti, who was probably 
following a do ut des strategy17. Given that in that moment a somehow 
discriminatory form of soft interpretation of the SGP1 was adopted by the ECOFIN 
for strong countries, whereas in the past a hard implementation of the norms had been 
obtained for weak countries, the Commission resorted to the European Court of 
Justice. The Court ruling of the following 13 July 2004 is unanimously considered 
“solomonic” and ambiguous:  on the one side, it  finds  legitimate the Council’s 
choice not to have proceeded against Berlin and Paris, in contrast with the 
Commission’s recommendation, but , on the other side, it “annuls the Council’s 
conclusions of November 25, 2003 towards France and Germany, as the Council 
holds the excessive deficit procedure in abeyance and modifies the recommendations 
previously made by the Council to each Member State for correction of their 
excessive deficit”. As Calmfors (2005) puts it: “the credibility loss necessarily follows 
“from the demonstration that the EU fiscal rules are endogenous and likely to be 
adjusted in response to violations”.  
Third, the importance of rewards and penalties has considerably diminished since the 
Maastricht Treaty: “with the move to a single currency,… the market incentives were 
reduced with the convergence of interest rates and the carrot of entry was eaten, while 
the stick of exclusion was replaced by the threat of sanctions under the SGP that 
might only materialise at a late stage if at all” (Buti, 2006).  
 
17This exchange of favours between European Governments may help them but sometimes can damage 
their countries, particularly those where the external constraint is the main instrument to transform 
myopic cicadas into far-sighted ants (see Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, 2001). As we will se later, the 
ECOFIN approach may have been rational relative to Germany, but probably was not correct relative 
to France. 
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Finally, it is worth noticing that, besides the probability of sanctions, even their cost 
diminishes when the number of “fiscal delinquents” rises: this is because the cost has 
a reputational component, beyond the pecuniary one, and it is negatively correlated 
with the frequency of cicada-States.  
4.6. Why is the SGP misspecified in ignoring the difference between demand and 
supply shocks especially in large countries? 
Furthermore, the reputational cost is not identical for every Member State, notably 
being smaller for larger countries, by nature more inward looking. As an interesting 
model by de Haan et al. (2003) shows, “a country that perceives the penalty for fiscal 
misbehaviour as low, perhaps because its size makes the ensuing loss in political 
reputation negligible, will have no incentive to choose a tight fiscal policy. 
Independently from the behaviour of other euro area Members,… the expected utility 
from selecting a loose policy will always exceed the expected utility level under a 
tight policy… An equivalent result holds at the opposite end of the spectrum. [For] 
the small country case tight fiscal policy dominates. If a country perceives the penalty 
for not playing according to the rules of the SGP as sufficiently high, for instance 
because its bargaining power within the euro area or EU is otherwise limited, it will 
always prefer to play according to the rules of the SGP… The expected utility level 
under a tight policy will always exceed that under a loose policy, rendering the former 
a dominant strategy independent of fiscal policy decisions elsewhere”. This same 
idea, focusing on the relevance of the countries’ size in the weight assigned by them 
to the compliance with the SGP1 rules, is already explicit in a previous paper by von 
Hagen (2003): he suggests “that the fiscal framework is indeed more effective in the 
small than in the large States, which implies that it is most effective where it matters 
the least, since a fiscal crisis in a small EMU Member State would hardly threaten the 
stability of the common currency”18.  
Buti-Pench (2004) provide a thorough review of the debate on the importance of the 
country size in determining the relevance and the effectiveness of the SGP1. 
 
18 Von Hagen looks at the empirical change in the debt ratio during the sub-periods 1992-1997 and 
1997-2001, distinguishing worse performing, large States (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Italy and Spain), intermediate States (Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden) with 
intermediate performances, and best performing small States (the other six of the EU-15). The 
distinction is made according to the 1997 national GDP percentage relative to EU-15 (the former 
group consisting of Member States with a GDP larger than 7%, the latter group with a GDP smaller 
than 2%). 
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“Explanations offered in the literature appeal to economic and institutional/political 
economy arguments. A first argument of traditional Keynesian flavour emphasised by 
the ‘French school’… is that the cost of fiscal consolidation tends to be larger in large 
countries and this would explain their reticence to reduce the deficit towards close-to-
balance… In this interpretation, the lack of consolidation in the period of strong 
growth in the first years of EMU was not a policy failure, but a ‘regression to the 
mean’ after years of Maastricht-induced belt tightening (Fitoussi-Saraceno, 
2002).More specifically, according to this view, the call simultaneously to pursue 
budgetary retrenchment and structural reforms… would not suit large economies 
while it may run in small countries where ‘the best demand policy is supply-side 
policy’. Compared to large, relatively closed economies, smaller, open economies 
have a stronger incentive to undertake supply-side reforms rather than pursuing an 
expansionary fiscal policy, since reforms not only boost potential output directly, but 
also reduce inflationary pressure which allows them to gain competitiveness and 
increase external demand… A second type of argument is that effective fiscal 
consolidation needs strong growth… Since large countries have grown considerably 
more slowly than smaller countries, their retrenchment efforts have been hampered… 
Clearly, there could be an interplay between the two types of arguments developed 
above: because of smaller external spillovers, large countries have lower incentives to 
pursue structural reforms. As a result, the economy tends to run in a lower gear and 
the country gets locked into a low-growth, high-deficit equilibrium”. Two other 
arguments of a political economy nature have been put forward to explain the 
different degree of compliance with EMU’s budgetary rules between large and small 
countries: one concerns the already-quoted question of probability and cost of 
sanctions; the other is related to “the quality of domestic budgetary institutions… 
Large countries are usually delegation States where the common pool problem is 
overcome by a strong agenda-setter, typically the Finance Minister who is primus 
inter pares within the Government… Instead, most smaller Member States achieve 
domestic budgetary coordination via commitment, whereby different parties negotiate 
a ‘fiscal contract’ involving strict budgetary targets… The SGP appears to be less 
suited to fiscal institutions prevailing in delegation States… Whether the size or the 
quality of domestic institutions matters is, however, open to question”. 
The size of the country is certainly relevant for our understanding of the difficulty 
some Member States showed in complying with the SGP1 rules, but it cannot explain, 
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by itself, the particular problems large Member States met starting in 2002, while in 
the first three years after the EMU introduction they were able to follow those SGP1 
rules. Germany was big both before and after 2002, but it became unable to stick to 
the Pact in that year, while in 1997 it was the most severe proponent of a rigorous 
application of the drei comma null ceiling for the deficit to GDP; in the last twenty-
five years, Germany had never overcome for three consecutive years the 3% deficit to 
GDP ratio as it did in the four-year interval 2002-2005 and not even in 1993 its deficit 
exceeded 3%, when Germany had the sharpest decline in the last 20 years in its GDP 
(-0.8%).  
In my opinion, the large size of a country becomes an element of the explanation of 
the excessive deficit, once it is combined with a large demand shock.  According to 
this approach, the missing distinction between a supply and a demand shock in the 
SGP1 is a major flaw: it is not sufficient to focus on the output gap; ignoring whether 
this gap is the outcome of a supply or a demand shock implies ignoring whether the 
deficit spending is irrational or rational from the viewpoint of any Member State, 
because an expansionary fiscal policy is an incorrect reaction to a supply shock 
involving higher inflation, while it is correct in front of a negative demand shock. In 
particular, a strong negative demand shock requires a deficit spending able to 
minimise the welfare loss of any country internalising all the effects this expansionary 
fiscal policy entails in terms of a rising interest rate. In this case, it is a mistake to 
impose a numerical target on that reaction. The SGP1 has a supply side logic which 
probably corresponds to the structural conditions of big countries in continental 
Europe, but not necessarily to their short term conditions. Facing a strong demand 
shock, a lax fiscal policy is not the result of the well-known free-riding problem. 
Quite to the contrary: this may be the result of a perfectly rational large Member State 
not subject to this kind of free-riding. Small countries belonging to the same single 
currency tend to be, on the contrary, more prone to free-riding and therefore want to 
“tie their hands and those of large countries” through the coordination of their fiscal 
policies, without allowing any special concession to anybody. Thus, they show to 
prefer even in the circumstance of a very negative demand shock a more 
contractionary fiscal policy for all Member States.  
A simple model will show the rationale for a very large country hit by a strong 
demand shock to ignore the precise rules on the deficit/GDP ceiling imposed to all 
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Member States belonging to the same currency union, while the same behaviour is 
irrational for small countries in identical circumstances. On the other hand, those rules 
are easy to follow, as they are non-binding even for large countries in all other events 
(supply shocks, small demand shocks).  
4.6.1. The model 
The model utilised here follows in particular the one by Uhlig (2003) and, as he says 
of his own, “has a number of limitations and should be seen in light of what it is 
meant to do: highlight the free-riding issue in a simple framework and provide some 
policy-relevant insights, at the risk of neglecting some key issues”.  
All variables are defined in terms of percentage deviations from their long run values, 
except for the interest rate, i, and are described by capital letters. All parameters are in 
small letters and are non-negative. Ignoring (unlike Beetsma et al., 2001) all the 
spillovers, except the one derived from the single currency monetary policy, let us 
assume that the output gap Ya of country a depends only on the deficit gap of that 
country, Defa, on the expected real interest rate, (i - Πea) with Πea equalling the 
expected inflation rate in country a and on a demand shock, Ea. The inflation rate, Πa, 
is an increasing function of the output gap and of a supply shock, Ua.  
Let us first consider in isolation the equilibrium of country a. Aggregate demand is 
Ya = ca Defa – va (i - Πea) + Ea . (1) 
 
Given that the relation between the deficit and the structural deficit (Defsa) depends 
on the output gap, as indicated by 
Defa = Defsa – maYa  ,           (2) 
 
where maYa shows the automatic stabilisers, 
Ya = fa Defsa – ka (i - Πea) + haEa    ,                                         (3)  
 
where 
fa  =  ca/(1 + ca ma) ;  ka  =  va/(1 + ca ma) ;  ha  =  1/(1 + ca ma) . 
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Aggregate supply is 
Πa = n Ya + Ua      , (4) 
 
with the slope of the curve, n, assumed to be identical in all countries to simplify 
calculations. 
The interest rate is supposed to be determined by the Central Bank “so as to ensure 
expected price stability in the mediun run, i.e. in the absence of shocks”, as assumed 
for example by Buti-Giudice (2002). Hence, Πea = 0 and i = faDefsa/ka. As Buti-
Giudice (2002) put it, “this implies that in the medium run monetary policy will offset 
any effect of fiscal policy on output and prices via an appropriate level of the interest 
rate but in the short run the Central Bank does not react to shocks”. 
Let us assume that the Government of country a fully internalises the reaction 
function of the Central Bank and the increase of i due to deficit spending. Let us also 
suppose that the Government cares both about the fiscal rule, setting a ceiling on Defs 
and Def, and about output stabilisation, and it wants to minimise the following 
quadratic loss function La: 
La  =  ½ [Defs2a + la Y2a]  , (5) 
 
where la captures the relative preference for output stabilisation relative to the fiscal 
rule. 
Optimisation leads to  
Defsa = 0  ,    Defa = - ma ha Ea    with  (6) 
 
Ya = haEa    and   Πa = n ha Ea  + Ua (7)    
 
The optimum solution is a structural balanced budget, combined with a deficit 
spending in the short run, utilising automatic stabilisers to counterbalance any 
possible negative demand shock (Ea< 0). Under these circumstances, the output gap 
becomes negative and inflation declines, which happens also with a positive supply 
shock (Ua< 0). Notice that, when the demand shock Ea is negative, the deficit gap has 
to be positive and any numerical constraint on the deficit spending under the level - 
ma ha Ea is not a first best (for example, at 3% of GDP): indeed, there may exist a 
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logical inconsistency between Defsa = 0  and Defa < 3% of GDP, a problem similar to 
the logical inconsistency between Defsa = 0  (which is the MTO of the SGP1) and 
Debt/GDP kept at a stable level higher than zero. On the other hand, no logical 
inconsistency arises if the demand shock is smaller, so that -ma ha E a < 3% of GDP, or 
if there is a supply shock, given that in this event no deficit would be optimally 
chosen.  
Let us now suppose that two countries, a and b, have a common currency and a 
common nominal (i) and expected real interest rate (i - Πe); while they take into 
account the feedback rule followed by the Central Bank in setting the nominal and the 
real interest rate, they do not coordinate their fiscal policies, playing a Nash non-
cooperative game. 
Their aggregate demand and supply are functionally similar, but their parameters 
differ  (i.e. fa  ≠ fb; ka  ≠ kb; ha  ≠ hb, but n is common to both countries). The 
monetary policy is now determined in a slightly more complicated way, so as to make 
the average expected inflation rate equal to zero, in the absence of shocks, i.e.  
(αYea +  β Yeb) = 0 , (8) 
 
where the superscripts e indicate the expected values, α and β identify the weights of 
country a and b respectively, with α + β = 1 and both positive. Hence 
i = (αfa Defsa + βfb Defsb) / (αka + βkb)  (9) 
 
Countries a and b, taking into account the Central Bank reaction function (9), 
minimise their loss function La, as in (5), and similarly Lb, as follows: 
 (10) 
                                β2fa kbfb ka                               hafaβkb (αka  + βkb) 
   Defsa = la Defsb   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  -   la Ea   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯    ,     




                                α2fa kbfb ka                               hbfb αka (αka  + βkb) 
   Defsb = lb Defsa  ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  -   lb Eb   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯           
                            (αka + βkb)2 + lb(fb αka)2               (αka + βkb)2 + lb(fb αka)2
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Equations (10) and (11) show why there are negative spillovers created by the 
existence of a single monetary policy, without any coordination between fiscal 
policies. Each country attaches only a limited importance to the impact of its deficit 
on the interest rate, effectively free riding in its fiscal decisions. On the other hand, 
each country reacts to the deficit increase in deficit of the other country, leading to an 
excessive deficit bias. The structural deficit is not set to zero any longer due to a 
coordination failure. “Ideally – as Uhlig (2003) recalls – fiscal policy should respond 
to the country-specific ‘fiscal demand shocks’, leaving it to the European Central 
Bank to respond to the average of the country-specific cost-push shocks. However, 
each fiscal authority will be tempted to try to improve the situation for its own 
country by, for example, expanding Government demand or Government deficits 
precisely when the ECB needs to combat cost-push shocks via higher interest rates. 
With all countries doing so, the ECB ends up combating not only the cost-push 
shocks, but the additional fiscal demands as well. While the ECB may ultimately be 
successful in avoiding any consequences for European inflation rates, the end result 
would be higher nominal interest rates and a situation that is worse for everybody. To 
avoid this free-riding problem, institutions need to be found that will ensure that 
country-specific fiscal policies stick to the task at hand and avoid this free-riding 
issue. The Stability and Growth Pact can be seen as doing exactly that: by limiting 
country-specific deficits, the temptation in each country to seek an improvement in its 
situation at the expenses of all other Members of EMU will be limited”.  
The imposition of fiscal rules, according to an ex ante coordination formula, binds the 
deficit ceiling of each country: this reduces the excessive deficit bias and implies an 
optimal solution whenever there is a supply shock or when the demand shock is 
limited, but it is only a second best solution, if there is a strong demand shock which 
cannot be fully compensated. As repeatedly observed, among others, by Beetsma-
Debrun (2004a), “although significant spillovers are necessary to make a case for 
closer fiscal coordination, they are not sufficient to establish that such coordination 
would be welfare-improving”. And Calmfors et al. (2004) add that, in the short run 
“there is no reason… to believe that the automatic stabilisers give an optimal degree 
of stabilisation… [On the contrary] if there are permanent supply shocks, the 
automatic stabilisers tend to prolong the adjustment process and cause budget effects 
that must ultimately be eliminated through discretionary action”.  
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It is now important to recognise that the free-riding behaviour of different countries, 
connected by a single currency and a single monetary policy, coeteris paribus differ 
according to their size. In order to see it, let us now assume that country a is 
extremely large and country b extremely small, so that α ∼ 1 and β ∼ 0. This means 
that the Central Bank reacts (almost) exclusively to the inflation pressures coming 
from country a and equation (10) is (almost) reduced to  
 (10’) 
   Defsa = 0 ,   Defa = - ma ha Ea  ,  with Ya = ha Ea  and Πa = n ha Ea  + Ua :     
 
this exactly corresponds to the optimal solution (6) – (7) obtained in the absence of 
any free-riding. Thus, a large country is almost able to fully internalise the full effect 
of its deficit on the interest rate. On the contrary, equation (11) is (almost) 
transformed into  
 
                                            fa kbfb                    hbfb  
   Defsb = lb Defsa   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  -  lbEb  ⎯⎯⎯⎯     ,      
                                         ka (1 +lb f2b)          1 + lbf2b
 
Defb = Defsb – mbYb  , 
 
                                 - hbfa                      Eb hb                      Eamaha hbfa
               with Yb = ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯    Defa +  ⎯⎯⎯⎯  -    ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯         
                             ka (1 +lb f2b)               1 + lbf2b         ka (1 +lb f2b) 
 
               and   Πb = n Yb  + Ub :     (11’) 
 
unlike the large country, the small country belonging to the currency union is 
negatively hit by the deficit spending of the other country, and by the demand shock 
of the latter (besides by its own). It is much more in the interest of the small than of 
the large country to fix some fiscal rules limiting the deficit spending of everybody. 
By contrast, the large country tends to ignore the spillover problems and takes into 
consideration almost the full effect of its behaviour on the interest rate, therefore 
reacting essentially only to an asymmetric demand shock hitting itself, Ea, not to a 
supply shock, nor to a demand shock regarding another country. The large country is 
indifferent to an ex ante coordination limiting its deficit spending in case of a supply 
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shock: it would not proceed to an expansionary fiscal policy anyway. It is in its own 
interest to balance its structural budget, using in the short run only the automatic 
stabilisers to fully compensate even a large demand shock. 
The problem and the solutions are slightly different if the countries, playing a Nash 
non-cooperative game, look at their own real interest rate: in this case, the aggregate 
demand of country a depends on i – Πea, the aggregate demand of country b depends on i – 
Πeb. Again, if a is very large and b is very small, Πea is (approximately) equal to the average 
Πe and is almost zero, reaching an optimal solution (approximately) with (10’). On the 
contrary, country b would choose a structural deficit level described by  
 
 (11’’) 
                                                fakbfb                            hbfb  (1 - nkb) 
              Defsb = lb Defsa   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯   -   lbEb   ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯   :      
                                      ka [(1 - nkb)2 + lb f2b]              [(1 - nkb)2 + lb f2b]   
 
 
this is similar to (11’) and identically suggests an excessive deficit bias, possibly to attenuate 
through an ex ante fiscal coordination between countries. 
Finally, if all countries were similar from every point of view including size and parameter 
values (now described without subscripts), equations (10) and (11) would be transformed as 
follows: 
 
                                      f2Defsb – 2hfEa                                
                     Defsa = l [ ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  ]  , (12) 
                                          4 + f2l              
 
                                       f2Defsa – 2hfEb                                
                     Defsb = l  [ ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯  ]   : (13) 
                                            4 + f2l             
 
the deficit bias would reappear in all countries, so that, without any fiscal coordination, the 
structural balance would differ from zero.  
 
4.6.2. My reform proposal of the SGP1 and the empirical evidence 
It is by now clear even from this simple model that a reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact should neither treat as identical all the shocks (of the demand or of the 
supply kind) creating an output gap, nor should it consider as identical the incentives 
different countries have in complying with the SGP1. The country size makes a 
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difference in the degree of myopic fiscal free-riding and on the weight attached to 
spillovers. One should also consider that, while in the long run, starting from a 
balanced structural budget, the deficit spending counterbalancing a negative demand 
shock may be limited within the binding constraints of the automatic stabilisers, in the 
transitory phase, starting from a debt and a deficit position above the reference values, 
the necessary deficit may have to overcome that limit, and a fortiori the 3% ceiling. 
As Fitoussi-Saraceno (2004) put it, “the Pact was designed assuming that 
Governments would accumulate surpluses in good times to allow the operation of 
automatic stabilisers in bad times. This ideal scenario, though, did not take into 
account the fact that this symmetry would only be attained after a long transition. In 
the meantime, Governments are being forced to adopt restrictive fiscal policies…The 
three largest countries, Germany, France and Italy do not even have room for the 
automatic stabilisers to play”. While I do not fully agree with the last sentence for 
reasons which will soon appear clearer, I recall that this ideal scenario is a limit of all 
our theoretical models. Another rather unrealistic element is to consider that the 
national fiscal decision-makers have a quadratic loss function to minimise. It is more 
realistic to assume that for political reasons those decision-makers prefer to expand 
fiscal policy in front of a negative demand shock, rather than restrict it in front of a 
positive shock: this asymmetry implies that the optimal solutions found in Paragraph 
4.6.1. hold true only when Ea<0, Eb<0, which correspond, however, to the most 
relevant case. Finally, the public opinion and the median voter being more concerned 
with the unemployment rate above the “normal” level (the long term, natural) than 
with the somehow obscure19 concept of output gap, a more realistic loss function 
than the one used in my model should take into consideration that aspect. This would 
not change our conclusions, if one adopts the Okun law, establishing a precise linear 
relation between the two gaps.  
My personal proposal for the reform of the SGP1 at this point consists of explicitly 
considering among the reasons for derogations to the excessive deficit procedure and 
to allow a deficit beyond the 3% of GDP, the possible existence of strong demand 
shocks. Looking only (and simultaneously) at the exceptionality of the excess deficit 
origin, at the temporariness and at the closeness to the reference value is not adequate. 
 
19 The concept of output gap is obscure for the public opinion, as it is the one of the natural rate of 
unemployment. Therefore in our empirical part we will adopt the simplifying hypothesis that the 
public opinion considers an increase in the unemployment rate as a signal of its abnormally high 
level.  
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In particular, as far as the first condition for derogation is concerned, applying the 
exceptionality clause, as it is currently done, only when the excess of the deficit over 
the reference value results from an unusual event outside the Member State’s control 
and/or in the presence of a severe economic downturn, without a proper distinction 
between supply and demand shocks appears incorrect: a negative supply shock should 
not be cured through deficit spending, contrary to a negative demand shock; taking 
only into consideration the output gap and not its source is therefore misleading. 
An immediate critique to my proposal could be twofold. Someone would probably 
point out that it is not only hard for the European Commission and the Council to 
distinguish the nature of the country-specific shock, but it is also difficult to adopt a 
common, and therefore homogeneous  European methodology to detect such nature in 
every Member State. I consider this critique partly invalid. It is currently possible for 
the European guardians of the Stability and Growth Pact to utilise three data-set 
which have been already homogenised by the European Commission Services for all 
the EU countries (and have been existing for many years in the euro area), but have 
never been exploited up to now in this context: they appear to provide a sufficient 
support for that purpose. Adopting this approach, a strong negative demand shock 
would be identified by the simultaneity of the three following empirical evidences: (1) 
an increase relative to the normal trend of the quota of firms declaring to be 
constrained by insufficient demand rather than by insufficient capacity or insufficient 
profitability;  (2) an increase in the unemployment rate coupled with (3) a decrease in 
the inflation rate, as it is well known that a negative supply shock always implies a 
rising inflation rate. The unemployment rates have been already estimated for many 
decades by Eurostat on comparable grounds across Europe. The inflation rates have 
been calculated on common European standards through the private consumption 
price deflator for many decades, but since 1997 it is available in the Union a 
(preferable) inflation series based on an harmonised consumer price index20. Finally, 
the European Business Surveys, indicating the percentage of firms constrained either 
by their output demand, or by their capacity and profitability, or by their difficulties in 
finding the proper labour force have been based on common methodologies and 
common statistical standards ever since 1985 for EU Member States21 (see Tables 1 
 
20 Of course, the inflation rate based on a non-harmonised CPI has been calculated for many decades in 
each European country. 
21 In many European countries and in the United States, these Business Survey data have been existing 
much before, generally starting in 1965. 
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and Graphs 1).  To the best of my knowledge, these latter data have very rarely been 
utilised not only for analytical purposes, but also as policy-instruments in addressing 
European problems. A notable exception is the so-called European Unemployment 
Program, initiated in the mid-80’s (see Drèze-Bean, 1990).  
For various reasons, both statistical ad political, special attention will be devoted to 
the period 1997-2005, as the SGP1 was born in 1997 and all the three harmonised 
data-sets exist since then.  In practice, we will identify in a country, in a given year, a 
strong demand shock when we will contemporaneously observe in that year an 
increase of the unemployment rate (u), a decrease of the harmonised inflation rate (π) 
and a rise of the demand relative to capacity constrained quota of firms above the 
average, called  detrended  demand  relative to capacity constrained regime  [(D – C) / 
(average D-C 97-05), using the symbols explained in Tables 1 and Graphs 2]. 
Therefore, we will say that there exists a strong demand shock when in the same year 
u is growing, π is falling and (D-C)/(average D-C 97-05) is bigger than 1.  
The three combined indicators suggest that in the years 2002-2003 some, but not all, 
Member States have suffered from a strong, negative demand shock. The fact that it 
was a country-specific shock is shown both by the fact that not even within the euro 
area (called EUR-12 in the Graphs) all countries were characterised by identical 
paths, but also that, consequently, that path was ambiguous22 at the EMU level. 
However, given that some European countries outside the euro area were equally hit 
by a strong, negative demand shock, the EU as a whole appears to be hit by a strong 
negative demand shock. 
Looking at the data and at the Graphs 2, one can see that Germany is the only big 
country to have suffered in the years 2002-2003 from a strong negative demand 
shock. Clearly, according to our indicators, this is not the case for the other four major 
European countries (France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain). This can be 
possibly explained recalling that after the soft landing of the United States in 2001 
and particularly after 9/11, Germany discovered, contrary to everybody’s 
expectations, that not only it was unable to substitute the United States’ “locomotive”, 
taking up the economic Western leadership, but additionally it was about to undergo a 
 
22 I use the term ambiguous to indicate hat the threefold signal of a strong negative demand shock 
appears in only one of the two years not to indicate that only some of the three variables  show the 
required sign. 
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very serious downturn. Starting in 2002, Germany has undergone a long stagnation 
with a clear recession in 2003. The economic sentiment of German firms reveals those 
years’ total loss of confidence, as indicated for example by the IFO index, which 
reaches between the end of 2001 and the end of 2003 minimum values relative to the 
trend (see ISAE, various years). The internal demand in Germany was lacking in 
those years, while the external demand was weakened by the slowdown of the world 
trade, although Germany was continuing to gain market shares. If one takes the 
overall annual export of the five major European countries equal to 100, Germany is 
the only one which presents an ever growing quota from 2000 on (38.3% in 2002, 
41% in 2005, while in the same time interval Spain goes from 7.8% to 7.9%, France 
declines from 20.6 to 19.4%, the U.K. from 17.4 to 16.2%, Italy from 15.8 to 15.5%, 
as illustrated by ISAE, 2006). In 2002-2003 and possibly later, the United Kingdom, 
being outside the euro area, certainly suffered from a too strong exchange rate relative 
to our single currency, but overall has observed in the period 1997-2005 a continuous 
decrease of the unemployment rate. Among the big European countries, Spain is the 
only success story of the last decade in the Continent and does not seem to be hit by 
any negative shock. By contrast, in the years 2002-2003, the possibly negative 
demand shock is outweighted by a negative supply shock in France, with productivity 
gains limited by delays in technological innovations and reductions in working hours, 
France being the only OECD country with increasing rigidities in the labour market 
between the end of the 80’s and the end of the 90’s (with no significant subsequent 
fall, see OECD, 2004).  Consequently, in France, unemployment and inflation both 
grew in those years, while firms were declaring an increasingly insufficient demand 
for their expensive products.  
Italy, in the meantime, shows an actual decrease in productivity, as output stagnates 
while employment rises and unemployment declines. Inflation, on the contrary, 
increases. Its loss of competitiveness relative to emerging developing countries like 
China is dramatic, especially in traditional sectors, as textile. This is a (probably long 
lasting) negative supply shock which could be only aggravated by deficit spending, 
especially taking into consideration Italy’s enormous debt level. Yet, both France and 
Italy, as much as Germany, start overcoming the 3% ceiling around those years (Italy 
continuously since 2001, with the exception of 2002, France continuously since 2002, 
with the exception of 2005), for motivations that can be explained by political 
economy but (unlike those of Germany) are not optimal in terms of our simple model. 
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A similar reasoning holds true for another big “fiscal delinquent” of the euro area, 
Greece. There is no evidence there of lack of demand in the years 2000, able to 
rationally explain the highest deficit to GDP ratio in Europe (always above 4%), 
combined with the highest debt to GDP ratio (never below 107.5%). On the contrary, 
the deficit spending of Portugal above 3% since 2004 may have  a logical motivation 
in the strong negative demand shock regarding that country in the period 2002-2004. 
Another interesting case to focus our attention is that of two small countries, 
traditionally economically closed to Germany, as Austria and the Netherlands, which 
appear to suffer of a strongly negative demand shock in the years 2002-2003, but in 
the ECOFIN maintain their rigour asking Germany to follow the SGP1 rules, even 
though the Netherlands breaks them in 2003 (reaching a deficit/GDP ratio of 3.1%) in 
front of a decrease in GDP by -0.1%, after a stagnation comparable to Germany (its 
GDP growth being 0.1 in 2002, as in Germany). This attitude of small countries, even 
when attained by the same strong (and possibly stronger) demand shock as Germany, 
seems to be possibly explained through our simple model: for them, negative 
spillovers weigh more and fiscal coordination is more desirable.  
Finally, among the Central-Eastern Member States of the Union, only the three most 
developed have been hit by a strongly negative demand shock in 2002-2003, 
Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, but only the two latter have shown a deficit to GDP 
beyond 3% in those years. One has to understand, however, that not only they do not 
belong to EMU but have entered into the EU only in May 2004. Today, of the eight 
Central-Eastern newcomer countries, only Hungary exceeds the 3% deficit to GDP 
ceiling. 
 
5. The SGP2 After the 2005 Reform of the SGP1   
The next step consists of testing whether the SGP1 reform, introduced by the Brussels 
European Council of March 22-23, 2005 and ratified by two Council Regulations of 
June 27, 2005 (numbers 1055/2005 and 1056/2005), satisfies the six types of 
criticisms mentioned above. The premise, of course, is that the Pact can be modified 
only within the limits set by Article 104 of the Treaty and can thus, on the one side, 
include those elements which are present in that primary norm but are absent from the 
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1997 and 2003 SGP1 rules, and, on the other side, can exclude those aspects which 
are present in the 1997 and 2003 secondary norms but not in the Treaty. 
My brief evaluation on the SGP2 is the following. The amendments introduced last 
year on the SGP1 are not only consistent with the Treaty, but are somehow closer to 
its spirit than the Pact itself, as they reach a good compromise between some (but not 
all) of the requests for revision, emerged in the past two years, illustrated in Section 4. 
The overall outcome is, however, disappointing. The reason for this assessment will 
clearly appear from the wording of the Presidency Conclusions of the March 2005 
Brussels European Council (to which I will refer in this Section, see 7619/05) but 
could, alternatively, be derived from the secondary norms of the June 2005 Council 
Regulations. 
The reader may find useful to look at Table 2 produced by the European Commission 
with the purpose to offer a detailed comparison between the SGP1 and the SGP2. I 
will keep examining the fiscal rules of the SGP2, as I did with the SGP1 and with 
Article 104: analysing four elements, objectives, derogations to the excessive deficit 
procedure, mitigating factors and sanctions. On short-term objectives, the European 
summit has introduced a more dynamic approach. Indeed, “Member States that have 
not yet reached their MTO should take steps to achieve it over the cycle. Their 
adjustment effort should be higher in good times; it could be more limited in bad 
times. In order to reach their MTO, Member States of the eurozone or of ERM-II 
should pursue an annual adjustment in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-offs and 
other temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark. ‘Good times’ should be 
identified as periods where output exceeds its potential level, taking into account tax 
elasticities”. More generally, the need to “avoid pro-cyclical policies” is reiterated, as 
asked for by many experts recalled in Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.3 and some policy-makers 
like Mr. Zalm, in order “to actively consolidate public finances in good times”.  
Furthermore, on the medium- and long-term objectives, the Brussels Spring summit 
recognizes, as Paragraph 4.4 has indicated, that due account must be taken of the 
connection between public deficit and debt and, as proposed by the former Chancellor 
Schröder, “of the growing economic and fiscal heterogeneity within the EU-25”. 
Thus, the Presidency Conclusions state that “MTOs should be differentiated and may 
diverge from positions of close to balance or in surplus for individual Member States 
on the basis of their current debt ratio and potential growth, while preserving 
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sufficient margin below the reference value of 3% of GDP. The range for the country-
specific MTOs for euro area and ERM-II Member States would thus be, in cyclically 
adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary measures, between -1% of GDP for low 
debt-high potential growth countries and balance or in surplus for high debt-low 
potential growth countries. The long-term sustainability of public finances would be 
supported by the convergence of debt ratios towards prudent levels. Implicit liabilities 
(related to increasing expenditure in the light of ageing populations) should be taken 
into account, as soon as criteria and modalities for doing so are appropriately 
established and agreed by the Council”. 
The novelties introduced by the European Council of March 22-23, 2005 in the area 
of derogations to the excessive deficit procedure are equally important, as in this case, 
too, significant, sensible changes rather than simple additions are observed. Indeed 
“the Council considers that the current definition of a ‘severe economic downturn’ 
given in Regulation 1467/97 is too restrictive… The Council considers the Paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of Article 2 in Regulation 1467/97 need to be adapted in order to allow 
both the Commission and the Council… to consider as exceptional an excess over the 
reference value which results from a negative growth rate or from the accumulated 
loss of output during a protracted period of very low growth relative to potential 
growth”. The negative sign of the growth rate becomes therefore sufficient for 
derogations. This allows for some more fiscal expansion in downturns and therefore 
may meet some of the critiques made by neo-Keynesian experts and by Governments, 
as seen in Paragraph 4.3, but still does not satisfy my own critical comments (see 
Paragraph 4.6) on the absence of any recognition of the difference between a country-
specific supply and demand shock. 
With reference to the mitigating factors and debt which the Commission should 
consider in evaluating budgetary positions, the Conclusions of the European summit 
of March 2005 state that “special attention must be paid to pension reforms 
introducing a multi-pillar system including a mandatory fully-funded pillar. Although 
those reforms entail a short-term deterioration of public finances during the 
implementation period, the long-term sustainability of public finances is clearly 
improved. Thus…Member States implementing such reforms should be allowed to 
deviate from the adjustment path towards the MTO, or from the MTO itself”. This 
seems to be an acknowledgement of the necessity to improve the consistency of the 
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Pact relative to other policy objectives of the European Union, as indicated in 
Paragraph 4.3.  
Finally, dealing with the timing and modalities of sanctions, the Brussels summit of 
March 22-23, 2005 introduces the novelty to postpone deadlines and soften sanctions 
relative to Regulation  1467/97. In particular, in special circumstances “the initial 
deadline for correcting an excessive deficit could be set one year later, i.e. the second 
year after its identification and thus normally the third year after its occurrence”. 
In the Presidency Conclusions some further lip service is offered to large countries: 
“An improved national ownership of budgetary policies” is hoped for, and special 
consideration is given “to budgetary efforts towards increasing or maintaining at a 
high level financial contribution …to achieving European policy goals, notably the 
unification of Europe [in primis of Germany!]” and  “ to fostering international 
solidarity”, as asked for by President Chirac. There are also some nice words able to 
please those (the English and the Italians) who were asking that productive public 
expenditures (in particular for research and employment) should be considered 
separately: “the Commission’s report … should appropriately reflect developments in 
the medium-term economic position (…the implementation of policies in the context 
of the Lisbon Agenda and policies to foster R&D and innovation) and developments 
in the medium-term budgetary position (…debt sustainability, public investment and 
the overall quality of public finances)”.  
Finally, very promising but utopian sentences are offered by the March 2005 
Presidency Conclusions both to those who thought the old SGP1 was not rigorous 
enough, and to those who felt the Pact was not flexible enough. Indeed, the new 
SGP2’s  “aim is not to increase the rigidity or flexibility of current rules but rather to 
make them more effective…  It is essential to secure a proper balance between the 
higher degree of economic judgement and policy discretion in the surveillance and co-
ordination of budgetary policies and the need for keeping the rules-based framework 
simple, transparent, enforceable”. But no innovation is introduced in the governance 
of the Pact, so that the problem of enforceability examined in Paragraph 4.5 remains 
essentially identical in the SGP2 as it was in the SGP1.  
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The overall evaluations of the SGP1 reform greatly vary according to the interpreters 
of the revision. In synthesis, some authors give a fail mark to the SGP2, some a pass, 
none consider it a straight A.  
Von Hagen (2006) thinks that “since the start of EMU, the disciplinary effect of the 
fiscal rule in EU has vanished… In March 2005, the European Council adopted an 
explicit list of excuses for persistent Government deficits and debt in excess of the 
thresholds set by the EDP. This decision further deprives the European Commission 
of its right to exert independent judgement on the fiscal performance of the EU 
Member States and effectively marks the end of the rule-based regime for fiscal 
policy in Europe”23. Coeuré-Pisany Ferry (2005), quite to the contrary, welcome in 
particular two elements introduced by the SGP2: “First, a consensus has emerged to 
give to the Commission the right to bark and bite, i.e. to send an early warning to a 
Member Country without the approval of the Council, although the corresponding 
legal provision has been a victim of the rejection by French and Dutch voters of the 
draft Constitution… Second, with the SGP2, the eurozone has moved away from its 
initial emphasis on governance by fixed rules and has reintroduced discretion. 
However… the risk of undisciplined case-by-case decisions guided by political 
pressure and horse-trading is significant”. Buti (2006), on the one hand, acknowledges 
that the changes induced by the SGP2 “got a mainly sceptical reception. Some 
commentators argued that, given the list of exceptions to the 3% rule and the greater 
discretion left to the Council, the Pact was de facto dead (Buiter, 2005; Calmfors, 
2005)”. But, on the other hand, he believes that there exist “two alternative 
prospective readings [of the SGP2]: an opportunistic ‘collusive’ deal and a ‘genuine’ 
adherence to the revamped rules… Whether and when a call for stronger fiscal 
discipline will arise depends on politics, the key factor being renewed ownership of 
the rules In the end, the new rules can be rigorously applied only if they are backed by 
key players and fully integrated in their natural policy framework”.  
 
23 De Haan et al. (2003) provide an ex ante evaluation equally drastic: “In fact, the reform will only 
make the Pact less credible as there is now even more scope for politically motivated manipulation of 
the process. So even though the Stability and Growth Pact will not be dead de jure, it seems likely 
that de facto the SGP rules will be put aside. Some authors would welcome this, as they feel that the 
rules in place lack legitimacy. For instance, Wyplosz (2002) argues that rules ‘tend to be rigid and 
artificial, which makes them ultimately impossible to defend in the face of public opinions’. We 
disagree, it will be much more difficult for Governments to explain convincingly why they put the 
same rules aside that they embraced unanimously earlier, now that these rules may start to bite”. 
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The Commission of the European Communities (2005), not surprisingly, gives a quite 
positive assessment to the 2005 reform of the Pact, concluding that “overall, the 
analysis suggests that the changes result in a broadly balanced set of new rules… The 
Kopits-Symansky score deteriorated on the criteria on which the SGP [mark 1] scored 
high… In particular, it appears that in comparison to the original Pact, the new 
provisions are less well-defined, contain a higher risk of interpretative ambiguity and 
are less transparent and more complex. On the other five criteria, when the ratings had 
been less positive, its score improved”.  
Buti et al. (2005) are less optimistic. In evaluating the SGP2, they consider that four 
elements of the SGP1 had to be changed: overcoming excessive uniformity, 
correcting procyclicality, increasing transparency and strengthening enforcement. 
According to their opinion, the SGP2 involves a positive modification relative to the 
SGP1 only in the first two aspects, while it is unclear to them whether there has been 
a deterioration or an improvement in the last two. In synthesis, they state that “the 
major weakness of the old rules was poor enforcement mechanisms. Will the new 
rules be more effectively enforced? The fact that in the new Pact there is a greater 
margin for discretion, but no independent enforcer, may increase the incentives for 
collusion by the Council in subverting the implementation of the rules. If so, lack of 
enforcement would persist or even be aggravated. However, as the new Pact 
encompasses better economic rationale and may improve national ownership and 
fiscal transparency, there may be a better chance that it becomes selfenforcing”. This 
position seems to be shared also by Beetsma-Debrun (2005).  
But on enforceability most experts agree that no step forward has been made by the 
SGP2 relative to the SGP1. Calmfors (2005) writes that “the exact damage from the 
reform of the Stability Pact will depend on how the revised rules are applied over the 
next few years. The current large deficits in especially France, Germany, Greece, Italy 
and Portugal will provide defining test cases. A loose interpretation of the revised 
rules, exploiting to a maximum degree the new exemption possibilities, will 
effectively kill off most of the remaining credibility of the EU fiscal framework. In 
the future, the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling will then at most operate as a non-binding 
benchmark in the public debate. A strict interpretation of the revised rules, involving 
sanctions in the case of continued excessive deficits in France, Germany and Greece, 
could, however, establish a precedent and put a limit to the weakening of the Stability 
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Pact. But such a development is unlikely, as the same forces that caused the 
breakdown of the enforcement mechanism in 2003 and the subsequent revision of the 
Pact continue to operate”.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The March 2005 reform of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact has been extensive but 
has not been realised in the most proper way. The revision is still incomplete and 
insufficient to allow for a better performance of fiscal policy in Europe. I think that 
the two major weaknesses of the SGP1 were its limited enforceability (due to badly-
conceived governance with the coincidence of guardians and delinquents) and its 
insufficient economic rationale (due to the absence of any identification of supply and 
demand shocks in the output gap). No improvement has been obtained by the new 
2005 SGP2 relative to the old SGP1 on these fronts; to some extent, they may even 
have worsened. 
It is true that the SGP2 has become more “intelligent”, with a more balanced mix 
between rules and discretion, so as to take into account in a less uniform way the 
different Member States’ situations, cyclical conditions, growth potentials and public 
finance historical disequilibria. But ultimately the SGP2 remains not really clever 
because, when more discretion is introduced, both in the number of contingencies to 
consider for applying the rules and also in the adoption of the excessive deficit 
procedures, the policy design concerning the governance of the Pact should improve 
and be redefined so as to be able to address the new major problems; however, this 
has not been the case, as the SGP2 has made no innovations following the lines 
indicated by Paragraph 4.5. Unfortunately the internal conflict of interests, stemming 
from the overlapping between controllers and controlled within the governance body 
responsible for the budgetary surveillance, has not been solved neither through a 
transfer of powers from the Council to the Commission or to any other possible future 
independent Authority, nor through a better balance of powers between the different 
European institutions involved in the European fiscal policy implementation. In fact, 
deep distortions remain in the governance of the SGP2, the surveillance of Member 
States’ budgets still being (irrationally, though comprehensibly) under the exclusive 
control of national Governments, namely of those who should be controlled. Their 
coordination policy, in this perspective, is perverse. Moreover, the Council’s 
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effectiveness in recommending fiscal adjustments to Partners in excessive deficit and 
eventually in sanctioning them only relies on moral suasion.  Unless those distortions 
are eliminated, the higher degree of discretion and flexibility introduced by the 2005 
SGP2 will become a new source of difficulties for the Union’s stability and growth. 
The result that optimistic observers expect from the 2005 review of the Pact – which 
is now perceived as more rational, hence more enforceable – risks to become an 
illusion eventually ending up in a weaker, more unreliable constraint easy to be 
bypassed, as pessimistic observers would say, especially considering that after 
November 2003 the Pact has lost its original credibility, being  strictly applied to 
small countries while it seems to be favourably interpreted for the large ones. If, 
according to the new 2005 SGP2, the cicada-States felt more free to enlarge their 
deficits, this would probably cause higher inflationary pressures, particularly in those 
large European countries dominated by structural supply problems, and would not 
increase output either in their domestic markets or, given the existing spillovers, in the 
rest of the Union.  On the contrary, interest rates would have to rise, justifying the 
stand of the European Central Bank which has insistently invited to avoid any Pact 
reform, perhaps drawing inspiration from that founding father of the European 
Community, Jean Monnet, who used to say that “before sending a letter you have to 
be sure to be able to write the answer”. 
This potentially negative outcome depends on the fact that the new 2005 Pact, as 
much as the old 1997 one, does not introduce the fundamental distinction between 
supply and demand shocks. Whereas an expansionary fiscal policy would be illogical 
in the former case, it may be optimal in the latter. If the country-specific demand 
shock is very strong, the deficit to GDP should be allowed to overcome, if necessary, 
the 3% ceiling. Given that this numerical target is stated in the Treaty itself, those 
considerations should appear in the list of derogations, as an amendment of the 
exceptionality clause, whereby the severe downturn would occur even in the absence 
of a GDP decline when there is a strong negative demand shock. The SGP2 would not 
need particular amendments in front of a modest demand shock or of a supply shock, 
although in the latter case it would be preferable to inhibit any counterbalancing 
deficit increase.  
The European Commission and the Council would certainly find some empirical 
difficulties in identifying asymmetric demand and supply shocks in the EU, and they 
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should adopt an harmonised methodology and common data-set in order to be 
politically accepted by all Member States. To start, my suggestion is to look at the 
simultaneous movements of three variables, whose statistics are already based on 
homogeneous standards in the Union: the firms’ constraints indicated by the European 
Business Surveys, the unemployment rate and the harmonised inflation rate. 
If, in a given year, in a given country, the latter declines and the unemployment rate 
rises, while the output demand relative to the capacity firms’ constraint exceeds the 
average trend, there is the presumption that this Member State is then facing a 
strongly negative demand shock. Had the Commission used this method in November 
2003, it would have probably agreed with the Council that Germany (but not France) 
was deserving a derogation in the excessive deficit procedure. If this method were 
applied now, the custodians of the Stability and Growth Pact should, on the contrary, 
very rigorously adopt that procedure without further delays not only with Germany, 
but also with Italy, Greece and Portugal.  
In conclusion, big innovations have been introduced in the 2005 SGP2 relative to the 
1997 SGP1. But the question arises: Is it too little, given that the rationale of the Pact 
is still very imperfect? Is it too late to restore its credibility, severely wounded in 
November 2003, in front of the deepest institutional crisis of the EU? 
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Firms' constraints, unemployment and inflation in the euro area (EUR-12) 
(1985-2005) 
              












  (NO) (D) (C) (LS) (u) (Π deflator)* 
1985 0.525 0.855 0.097 0.052 9.3 5.7 
1986 0.545 0.842 0.100 0.058 9.3 3.4 
1987 0.548 0.878 0.080 0.042 9.2 3.0 
1988 0.580 0.769 0.155 0.076 8.9 3.3 
1989 0.589 0.635 0.230 0.135 8.2 4.6 
1990 0.589 0.347 0.418 0.236 7.6 4.4 
1991 0.559 0.648 0.197 0.155 7.8 4.9 
1992 0.572 0.883 0.060 0.058 8.2 4.4 
1993 0.470 0.950 0.028 0.022 10.1 3.8 
1994 0.562 0.870 0.073 0.057 10.7 3.1 
1995 0.663 0.739 0.170 0.091 10.5 2.6 
1996 0.571 0.880 0.078 0.042 10.7 2.1 
1997 0.611 0.829 0.099 0.072 10.6 1.7 
1998 0.658 0.736 0.144 0.120 10.1 1.1 
1999 0.618 0.779 0.125 0.097 9.2 0.8 
2000 0.624 0.588 0.211 0.202 8.2 2.5 
2001 0.620 0.658 0.137 0.205 7.9 2.4 
2002 0.591 0.803 0.109 0.088 8.3 1.9 
2003 0.581 0.832 0.113 0.056 8.7 2.0 
2004 0.573 0.717 0.226 0.057 8.9 2.0 
2005 0.574 0.723 0.221 0.056 8.6 1.9 
       
1985-2005 0.582 0.760 0.146 0.094 9.1 2.9 
1997-2005 0.606 0.740 0.154 0.106 8.9 1.8 












Table 1 (continued) 
Firms' constraints, unemployment and inflation in the European Union (EU-25) 
(1996-2005) 


















  (NO) (D) (C) (LS) (u) (Π deflator)* 
1996 0.482 0.821 0.114 0.061 10.4 2.7 
1997 0.508 0.748 0.150 0.102 10.1 2.2 
1998 0.546 0.683 0.192 0.125 9.4 1.7 
1999 0.518 0.751 0.153 0.096 9.1 1.2 
2000 0.522 0.606 0.213 0.181 8.6 2.4 
2001 0.523 0.652 0.167 0.181 8.4 2.4 
2002 0.490 0.768 0.144 0.088 8.8 1.8 
2003 0.484 0.784 0.150 0.066 9.0 2.0 
2004 0.469 0.673 0.253 0.074 9.1 1.9 
2005 0.468 0.674 0.252 0.075 8.7 1.9 
       
1996-2005 0.484 0.730 0.166 0.104 0.1 0.1 
1997-2005 0.503 0.704 0.186 0.110 0.1 0.1 
       
 
* This inflation rate (П deflator) has been existing for many years. On the contrary, the inflation rate 
based on harmonised consumer prices (П), utilised in the Graphs, has been existing only since 1997 for 
all the EU Member States, except Malta and Cyprus, therefore ignored in our data-set.  
 
Sources: Commission of the European Communities, Statistical Annex of European Economy, Spring 
2006; Commission of the European Communities, European Business Surveys, various years. 
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Table 2. : Main changes to the Stability and Growth Pact following the Council 
agreement of 20 March 2005 
 
 Original Revised 







All Member States (MS) have a 
medium-term budgetary objective of 
‘close to balance or in surplus’. 
 
• Country-specific differentiation of MTOs according to 
stock of public debt and potential growth. 
• MTOs for euro-area and ERM II MS are set between – 
1 % of GDP and balance or in surplus (in cyclically 
adjusted terms and net of one-offs). 
• Implicit liabilities to be taken into account at a later 




towards the MTO 
 
No specific provisions. • MS to take active steps to achieve the MTO. 
• Annual minimum adjustment for MS of the euro area or 
of ERM II of 0.5 % of GDP. 
• The effort should be higher in ‘good times’. 
• ‘Good times’ are identified as periods where output 
exceeds its potential level, ‘taking into account tax 
elasticities’. 
 
Early policy advice 
 
Early warnings are  
adopted/addressed by the Council, 
upon recommendation of the 
Commission. 
 
In addition, the Commission can issue direct ‘early policy 
advice’ to encourage MS to stick to their adjustment path. 
To be replaced by ‘early warnings’ in accordance with the 




No specific provision. 
 
Reforms will be taken into account when defining the 
adjustment path to the MTO and may allow a deviation 
from it under the following conditions: 
• only major reforms (direct/indirect impact on 
sustainability); 
• safety margin to the 3 % reference value is guaranteed; 
• the deficit returns to the MTO within the programme 
period; 
• detailed information is provided in the stability/ 
convergence programmes. 
Special attention to systemic pension reforms. 




Preparing a report 
under Article 104(3) 
 
 
No obligation for the Commission to 
prepare a report if a deficit exceeds 3 
%. 
  
• The Commission will always prepare a report in cases 
where there is a deficit above 3 %. 
• The report will examine whether the exceptions in 
Article 104(2) apply. 
• It will take into account whether the deficit exceeds 






‘Severe economic downturn’ if there 
is an annual fall in real GDP of at 
least 2 % for the preparation of the 
report under Article 104(3) by the 
Commission, and in decisions under 
Article 104(6) by the Council, if 
observations by the Member State 
concerned show that the downturn is 
exceptional in light of evidence of the 
abruptness of the downturn and the 
accumulated loss of output with 
respect to past trends. The MS 
commit not to invoke the severe 
economic downturn when growth is 
above – 0.75 %. 
An economic downturn may be considered ‘severe’ in 
cases of a negative growth rate or accumulated loss of 
output during a protracted period of very low growth 






No specific definition of ‘ORFs’ and 
their role in the excessive deficit 
procedure. 
 
The Commission report under Article 104(3) will take into 
account: 
- developments in the medium-term economic position 
(potential growth, cyclical conditions, implementation of 




- developments in the medium-term budgetary position 
(public investment, quality of public finances, as well as 
fiscal consolidation in ‘good times’, debt  sustainability); 
- any other factors, which, in the opinion of the MS, are 
relevant in order to assess the excess over the 
reference value. 
• ORFs will be considered in the steps from Article 
104(4) to (6) only if the excess over the reference value 
is temporary and the deficit remains close to the 
reference value. Any deficit above 3 % that is neither 
close to the reference value nor temporary will be 
considered excessive. 
• If the Council has decided that an excessive deficit 
exists, the ORFs will also be  onsidered in the 
subsequent procedural steps of Article 104 (except in 
Article 104(12), i.e. abrogation, and when deciding to 





No specific provision • These are treated like an ORF, but under strict 
conditions also with a role in abrogation. 
• Consideration to the net cost of the reform will be given 
regressively for the initial five years after an MS has 
introduced the reform (or five years after 2004). 
Increasing the 
focus on debt and 
sustainability 
No specific provision • The debt criterion, and in particular the concept of a 
debt ratio ‘sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace’, will be applied 
in qualitative terms. 
• The Council will formulate recommendations on the 




deadlines for taking 
effective action and 
measures 
 • Deadlines are extended: for a decision under Article 
104(6) — from three to four months after notification; 
• for taking effective action following Article 104(7) — 
from four to six months;  
• for moving to Article 104(9) — from one to two months; 
• for taking action following a notice under Article 104(9) 




No specific provision Countries in excessive deficit are required to achieve a 
minimum fiscal effort of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a 
benchmark. 
 
Initial deadline for 
correcting the 
excessive deficit 
The excessive deficit has to be 
corrected in the year following its 
identification, unless there are 
‘special circumstances’. 
The rule remains; possible extension by one year based 
on ORFs and on the condition that minimum fiscal efforts 
have been taken. 
 
Repetition of steps 
in the EDP 
Not foreseen Deadlines for correcting the excessive deficit can be 
extended if:  
• effective action has been taken by the MS concerned in 
compliance with the initial recommendation or notice, 
and 
• unexpected adverse economic events with major 







Source:  Public Finances in EMU 2005, European Economy, Number 3, 2005 
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Sources: For the rate of unemployment (u) Commission of the European Communities, Statistical Annex of 
European Economy, Spring 2006; for the inflation rate based on the harmonised CPI (π), European Central Bank, 
Statistics, various years; for the detrended demand relative to capacity constrained regime (D-C)/(average D-C 97-
05), see Commission of the European Communities, European Business Surveys, various years.  
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